Cultural Conceptions
for Lauren

Surely there are in everyone's life certain connections, twists and turns which pass awhile under the category chance, but at the last, well examined, prove to be the very Hand of God.

SIR THOMAS BROWNE, Religio Medici
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Introduction

In 1993, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling in *Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic* the logic of which, although predictable in many respects, might nevertheless give even the most seasoned skeptic reason to pause and consider—indeed, marvel in disbelief at—how dramatically refigured the landscape that is abortion has become over the course of the past two decades. In this case, the Court was asked to determine whether the "rescue" demonstrations engaged in by anti-abortion activists at abortion clinics for the purpose of disrupting clinic operations deliberately deprive women seeking abortion (and related medical and counseling services) of their constitutionally protected right to interstate travel by making the destination of that travel inaccessible. Although the Court ruled that such demonstrations *did not* infringe upon women's constitutional rights, what is striking about this case is not its outcome. What is striking is the reasoning that produced the Court's ruling, the notion, in other words, that anti-abortion demonstrations do not deprive women of having or exercising any constitutionally secured right or privilege because such demonstrations are conducted for the sole purpose of protecting abortion's "innocent victims," and thus *have nothing to do with women.*

Centrally at issue in *Bray* was the meaning and scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and in particular, the first clause of the Reconstruction-era statute. Through a series of decisions handed down by
the Court in the intervening century or so, this clause had come to be interpreted as prohibiting activities among two or more persons (conspiracies) motivated by "some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based invidious discriminatory animus" and intended, either directly or indirectly, to deprive others of having and exercising their constitutionally protected rights and privileges. The question was whether this clause could be said to provide a federal cause of action against demonstrators who obstruct clinic access and operations. Or, re-posing and sharpening the question to bring more clearly into focus its stakes as the Court assessed them in Bray, Does opposition to abortion constitute a basic discriminatory attitude toward women in general? Are antiabortion demonstrations motivated by a discriminatory animus directed specifically at women and conducted for the purpose of impeding their protected right to interstate travel, affecting their conduct, or forcibly preventing them from exercising a right still guaranteed by Roe v. Wade?

Writing for the majority, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia dismissed as absurd the notion that opposition to abortion—blockading clinic entrances, damaging clinic property, threatening and intimidating clinic clientele, and overwhelming local law enforcement—could "possibly be considered an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism towards) women." As Scalia figured the matter, "the characteristic that formed the basis of the targeting . . . , was not womanhood, but the seeking of abortion." Motivated by the desire to stop abortion and reverse its legalization, rescue operations, he argued, were simply that: "physical interventions between abortionists and the innocent victims of abortion" with the clear and ultimate goal of "rescuing" innocent human lives. As such, they were not aimed at or defined with reference to women, nor could they be said to reflect a derogatory view of, an overtly hostile attitude toward, or a conscious, discriminatory intent with respect to them. "Whatever one thinks of abortion," Scalia argued, "there are common and respectable reasons for opposing it other than hatred of or condescension toward (or indeed any view at all concerning) women as a class."

Any view at all? While recognizing that opposition to abortion is not, as Justice Stevens put it in his dissenting opinion, "ipso facto to discriminate invidiously against women," we might nevertheless be inclined, as was Stevens, to reconsider the obvious: only women have the capacity to become pregnant and thus to need or have an abortion.
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In this respect, abortion is and always has been a "uniquely female practice," a practice in which only women engage. It is, moreover, a right that only women possess and have the capacity to exercise, and one might argue that it is precisely this capacity that is constrained or thwarted when violence is used to intimidate women entering clinics. Finally—and this Stevens noted only furtively in his dissent—abortion is an issue that has shaped and been shaped by a dense constellation of questions and an equally dense set of cultural contests, in both this century as well as the last, despite its shifting meanings having to do with the control and containment of women's fertility and sexuality, the terms and conditions of childbearing and child rearing, the meaning of motherhood and manhood, and the structure, meaning, and organization of the family as well as of gender, marriage, reproduction, and heterosexuality. If Operation Rescue claims—as it did in a 1990 editorial—that it is the rightful heir of the women's movement and that its members have become "the true defenders of women in this generation . . . [by] allowing women to be what God intended them to be," how is it possible that they could, as Scalia maintains they do, oppose abortion and not have "any view at all concerning women"? What is the view that Scalia contends, and the majority of the Supreme Court apparently agrees, is no view at all?

In each of the chapters in this book I proffer a response to this question and a range of others like it by interrogating the cultural crafting and apparatuses of vision in the context of contemporary debates over new and, in the case of abortion and some forms of surrogacy, not-so-new reproductive practices and processes. Chapter 1 takes up the issue of vision directly and begins by considering Olive Sacks's account of a fifty-year-old man whose sight was restored through surgery after forty-five years of blindness and who nevertheless was unable to "see"—to make sense of the images and objects that appeared within his field of vision. Using Sacks's account to develop the notion that what we typically regard as contaminating vision is precisely its precondition, I argue, following other cultural theoretists, that "seeing" is a thoroughly situated and mediated activity. Indeed, as Sacks's tale forcefully illustrates, "The innocent eye is blind." Seeing is a set of learned practices, a set of densely structured and structuring interpretive practices, that engages us in (re)producing the world we seem to apprehend only passively and, through such engagement, facilitates the automatic, if incomplete, operation of power. Subsequent chapters
work from and complexify this initial discussion of vision or seek to
discern more finely the multiple and often contradictory logics and op-
erations of seeing—the theoretical underpinnings, grounding assump-
tions, and cultural stakes—that render both plausible and possible the
many stories that now circulate in this late-twentieth-century North
American moment about reproductive relations and relationships.
Each chapter is occasioned by one of the many public controversies
that erupted during the 1980s and early 1990s over the use of a new
reproductive technology or one of several highly publicized disputes
that ensued when alternative reproductive arrangements produced an
excess of relationships that proved difficult to configure socially or to
consolidate legally. The readings that follow in each, taken together,
foreground, map, and critically scrutinize how legal, medical, scien-
tific, and popular discourses work and have worked—more or less
successfully—to manage the destabilizing effects and contain the de-
stabilizing potential of alternative reproductive arrangements and re-
lations, or keep intact a world that otherwise appears and is presumed
to be self-evidently given.

In chapter 2, I sketch in broad strokes some of the constitutive com-
ponents of the production of a new form and practice of life, the fetus-
as-person, along with the subtle, sometimes not so subtle, and, in either
case, significant shifts in the juridical position of women that both
abetted and accompanied this production. The chapter opens with the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearings on the personhood status of
the fetus. Conducted in 1981, these hearings were dismissed at the time
by critics as a thoroughly transparent political ploy in which moral and
theological arguments with respect to the question of fetal personhood
were refigured as “science,” or new discoveries in human embryology
and the still nascent field of fetology. And, notwithstanding pretense, a
clearly reactionary agenda was at play in eclipsing, at least partially, the
vast chasm between what senators and scientists throughout the hear-
ings seemed nevertheless to treat as comparable, interchangeable cate-
gories. However, through a frame that now spans nearly fifteen years,
the effects of these hearings seem to me decidedly far-reaching. Al-
though a dubious political ploy, clearly, they were as well a rhetorically
masterful—because publicly persuasive—performance that proffered
scaffolding for the subsequent, decade-long, reconstruction of who (or
what) is a subject with legal standing. They represent a moment of
great theater that would undoubtedly have passed into obscurity, but
was instead repeatedly restaged throughout the culture and decade, bolstered by the momentum of a national backlash, animated by a cultural rescripting of the representational texts of difference, and augmented by the development and mainstream marketing of new reproductive innovations and interventions.

If the debate about abortion more or less initiates the discussion in chapter 2, abortion is nevertheless treated throughout the discussion as merely one reproductive technology that has shaped and has been shaped by the development and application of others. Extending the lens in this way or placing abortion in a larger discursive context provides a more richly textured rendering of the reproductive landscape of the 1980s. It works to highlight the powerful, constitutive influence of abortion discourse on how such issues as postmortem ventilation, fetal therapy and repair, infertility, in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, and ultrasound imaging—issues otherwise treated, publicly, as discrete—were substantively construed across the distinct but related arenas of law, medicine, science, and popular culture. It also throws into clear relief the resculpting effect that these new and, in some cases, experimental reproductive practices have had with respect to the meaning and public construction of abortion. When Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued in a dissenting opinion in Akron that the trimester framework set out by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade was “clearly on a collision course with itself” and “completely unworkable” because “fetal viability in the first semester of pregnancy may be possible in the not too distant future,” the effect in this case of arresting visual images and widely publicized, highly sensationalized (and only rarely successful) obstetric techniques, is obvious.12

In chapter 3, I bring the contemporary debate about abortion more centrally and exclusively into focus or stage an examination of the shifting registers of cultural meaning that construct abortion through a close reading of a rhetorically rich nine-minute, ostensibly “pro-choice” video, S’Aline’s Solution. This 1991 video depicts one woman’s struggle to come to terms with an aborted pregnancy and is particularly instructive in its use of what I argue is a distinctly post-1980s vernacular with respect to abortion. Reminiscent of videos produced by proponents and opponents of abortion throughout the 1980s, S’Aline’s Solution adopts an aura of medical authority, largely through its use of bioscape imagery from Lennart Nilsson’s widely acclaimed Nova documentary, The Miracle of Life. It ostensibly situates viewers
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“inside” the reproductive body as witnesses to what is clearly intended to be read as a saline abortion. And, finally, it participates in the moral rehabilitation of “choice” through a sobering performance of regret and the use of images of fetuses in utero—images drawn from Nilsson’s Miracle of Life and identified by the video’s voice-over as the child who “will never be child”—that together work to counter the antiabortion charge that women have abortions without thought and for trivial reasons. As in contemporary discourse and debate, even among those who champion “choice,” S’Aline’s Solution constructs abortion as a violent and traumatic interruption of natural processes or a grim and grievous choice. Although questions of sexual freedom and reproductive autonomy may haunt what the video artist insists is a “prochoice” text, these questions are eclipsed in the end by the more riveting story the video appears to present of innocence imperiled and innocence betrayed.

S’Aline’s Solution occupies what are, in effect, prolife representations, meanings, and practices as the given of abortion and, in this occupation, both suggests and reveals, among other things, the degree to which prolife discourse has so saturated public debate as to now set its terms and seem part of the fabric of fact. The interesting question with respect to the video and other sites of cultural contest as well is whether images like the ones that have circulated in the context of the abortion dispute can be appropriated and oppositionally inflected. Can such images be shackled to narrate a story altogether different from the one they typically service and eventually seem self-evidently to tell? I argue that, at least in the case of the video, the strategy of re-inflection fails, so great is the undertow of signification that surrounds the bioscape imagery and, in particular, the image of the free-floating fetal form. And what underwrites and forcefully sustains this claim is the curious—some might say perverse—“fact” that the sequence of images in the video that audiences consistently read as depicting a saline abortion are “actually” images, again drawn from Nilsson’s Miracle of Life, of ejaculation. Although viewers embark on an excursion of discovery at the opening of S’Aline’s Solution, it is an altogether different kind of excursion than they have been led to believe they are on. Indeed, what viewers encounter is not a life-and-death drama as it naturally unfolds, but a (social) text and one whose story they are not just passively reading, but actively constructing.

In chapters 4 and 5, I shift the focus of analysis to consider the prac-
tice of surrogacy, or “contract pregnancy” as it is sometimes called, to foreground the otherwise elided presence of the market in relations that have traditionally been regarded as “outside” wage labor and commercial production. Scholars disciplinarily situated in sociology, law, women’s studies, political science, and anthropology have written in clear, precise, and often persuasive ways about surrogacy’s commercial underpinnings, its potential for exploitation, and its similarities to prostitution, as well as its value in expanding reproductive choice and thus freedom. On other fronts, considerable attention has been devoted to developing policy with respect to the practice and to determining whether and in precisely what ways it should be regulated. In the interest of avoiding confusion, I should say at the outset that what I find compelling about the controversy that surrounds this alternative reproductive arrangement has little to do with questions of commercialization and policy formation or with the legislative breast-beating that periodically transpires in the acrimonious, anxiety-ridden moment of a breached contract. What I find particularly interesting and worth pausing over—indeed, what is scrutinized in chapters 4 and 5—is the way in which the courts have attempted both to make sense of and to metabolize the practice.

In chapter 4 I proffer a critical examination of the infamous 1987 New Jersey case of Baby M, and in chapter 5 I examine the somewhat less well-known, but no less striking, 1991 California case of Anna Johnson. In both chapters I take a considered look at the constellation of narratives the courts deployed in these cases and the multiple translations in which they engaged not merely to referee but, in some more fundamental sense, to make legible surrogacy’s deeply unsettling if also inescapable “excesses” within existing understandings and structures of kinship. Judge Sorkow in the Baby M case and Judge Parslow in the case of Anna J were both faced with the clearly formidable task of explaining how it was that the pregnant body was not also—or at least need not be considered as—the real maternal body. Indeed, both judges were called upon to decipher how it was that the pregnant body could be an instrument of monogamous heterosexual union and thus nature and, at the same time, a decidedly unnatural, utterly extraneous, and potentially menacing constituent of that union once it had performed its function.

How was this body to be made sense of and accounted for, and by what name would it be called? Or, situating these questions within the
frame of the court, what cultural texts scripted and were transmitted through Sorkow's finding that Mary Beth Whitehead—a high school dropout and former sex worker—was merely a “viable vehicle” for the fulfillment of Bill Stern’s constitutionally protected right to procreate and “unfit,” in any event, to raise a child to whom she was related genetically, but to whom, in his reading, she bore no “maternal” tie? And, asking now a similar question of Judge Parslow’s ruling, What cultural narratives underwrote and made plausible the judge’s claim that Johnson’s only tie to the white baby she had gestated, but with whom she shared no genetic link, was, at best, that of a “foster parent,” analogous to, but no more significant, socially, than the kind of provisional bond he imagined a wet nurse might form with her charge? Finally, with respect to both cases, what social worlds and relations rendered surrogacy legally and culturally legible and, in rendering it legible, were themselves reproduced?

That each of the rulings worked, in the end, to safeguard the prerogatives of race and class privilege seems to me, in some sense, both obvious and given—preserving these prerogatives is part of the containment project entailed in both interrupting and regulating the proliferation of meanings, identities, and relationships generated by the panoply of new reproductive practices. The interesting and important challenge, I would argue, lies in tracking how such entitlements and the systems of classification that organize them are produced as matters of natural fact—indeed, how in the context of the surrogacy rulings the pregnant body is produced as self-evidently parasitical and in that production becomes yet again and yet another (kind of) instrument of reproduction.

Chapter 6 constitutes what I think of as the transitional moment in this book. With the questions raised at the end of chapter 5 concerning Anna Johnson’s custody bid and “black maternal nature” framing its discussion, chapter 6 functions as well as a kind of preamble to the analysis I develop in the final chapter organized around what Sarah Franklin has characterized as the culture’s current romance with genes. Chapter 6 moves on from surrogacy to consider the set of responses that swiftly followed the 1994 publication of The Bell Curve, an eight-hundred-page tome by the late Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in which the authors link social stratification to genetically rooted differences in cognitive capacity. More specifically and, for that matter, accurately, in this chapter I pause over the disturbing
lack of response amid volumes of otherwise exercised commentary to what occupies the good middle third of the book—to wit, Herrnstein and Murray’s arguments regarding black women’s fertility and out-of-wedlock births as well as the authors’ eugenically motivated recommendations for both regulating and rehabilitating the reproductive black female body.

I argue that, notwithstanding the more obvious and obviously incendiary issue of IQ, the primary object of Herrnstein and Murray’s ire, and the primary subject of their book, is what they regard as the federally subsidized procreative excesses of self-evidently promiscuous black women. Black women’s bodies emerge in their text as the site and source of social pollution, cultural degeneracy, mental deficiency, and genetic incapacity, and it is on, in, and through these bodies that they insist social policy must be performed. As Murray put the matter in a 1993 editorial for the Wall Street Journal, “Single women with children are a drain on the community’s resources and in larger numbers destroy a community’s capacity to sustain itself.”

Although commentators have taken critical aim at The Bell Curve’s scientific pretensions and underpinnings and been riveted by the question of whether the book’s analysis insults or bears witness to what some have described as the nation’s democratic, egalitarian legacy, they have more or less greeted its vitriolic reading of the reproductive strategies and practices of African American women with silence. In chapter 6 I query the possible meanings of this silence and their chilling implications and argue that, in effect, such silence keeps in place and at play a set of meanings with respect to black women’s bodies that renders Herrnstein and Murray’s proposals, as they themselves have claimed they are, both modest and reasonable.

With the discussion of The Bell Curve in chapter 6, the attention of the book gravitates toward a corner of the reproductive landscape where border skirmishes in recent years over how genes will signify, culturally—and, thus, over who or what gets to count as fully human—have grown both more inflamed and more perilous. In chapter 7 I linger on this landscape to explore the changing geography of desire and dread that characterizes contemporary responses to new reproductive and genetic innovations, taking up the controversy that erupted in 1993 when it was announced that two researchers from George Washington University, Jerry Hall and Robert Stillman, had cloned seventeen human embryos. Although the experiment itself was
considered “unremarkable science,” it nevertheless incited a moment of global hyperventilation or “national hysteria,” as bioethicist John Fletcher described it. The cloning venture was said to mark both a dangerous turn and a critical juncture in the ongoing showdown between technoscience and humanism. It was also widely condemned for having, if not imperiled, then certainly insulted human difference, singularity, and authenticity or precisely what many commentators seemed to agree distinguishes humans as human and from each other.

What is perhaps predictable but instructive about the border skirmish over cloning is the pervasive fear of “sameness” that was reflected in popular responses to the experiment, particularly given the general cultural intolerance toward “difference” that seems only to have intensified in recent years. Equally as instructive are the collective fantasies of monstrosity that this fear incited and the quick appeal that was made to genetics—as the guarantor of individual originality and authenticity as well as cultural diversity—to keep these monsters at bay. In chapter 7 I suggest that, contrary to popular imaginings, sameness, repetition, and replication are not the issue. As Mary Douglas puts the matter and as we will see repeatedly rehearsed throughout this book, part of the work of institutions is “to bestow sameness or turn the body’s shape to their conventions.” The issue across discursive arenas is rather how to contain the proliferation of differences or render diversity and difference socially legible, and both of these, I argue, are what geneticizing does. Appealing to genetic essentialism to preserve individual originality and diversity, as many did in the cloning controversy, solves very little in the end. It may ostensibly repair and close to traffic one set of borders that circumscribe the distinctly human, but, as I suggest throughout this final chapter, such an appeal produces its own parade of monstrosities in opening up yet others.
Notes

Introduction

1. In areas where abortion services are unavailable, women seeking abortion are typically forced to travel across state lines for health services. At the particular clinic in question, 20 to 30 percent of the clientele consisted of out-of-state travelers.


3. Ibid., 15.

4. Ibid., 12.

5. Ibid., 13.

6. Ibid. (Stevens’s dissent with Blackmun concurring), 51–53.

7. There is subtle shift worth noting with respect to how abortion is being read/configured in this dissent. In *Roe v. Wade*, abortion is defined as first and foremost a medical matter and the purview of medical professionals. In *Bray*, Stevens characterizes abortion—and apparently Blackmun accepts the characterization—as a distinctly female practice or a practice in which only women engage. Clearly the discourse on fetal life has forced a refiguring that foregrounds women.

8. What is at issue here is what kind of right abortion is. See *Bray*, 54–55 of Stevens’s dissent.

9. For some of the ways in which these issues have been figured in legal discourse, see Reva Siegel, “Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,” *Stanford Law Review* 44 (1992): 261–381.

10. Quoted in Peggy Phalen, *Unmarked: The Politics of Performance* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 143: “What has happened to the women’s movement?” the organization’s newsletter, *Rescue Report*, asked in a 1990 editorial: “We have picked it up; we have become the true defenders of women in this generation by allowing women to be what God intended them to be. We are the ones who are intervening for women in the courts. We are the ones helping single women raise their families.” In this passage the discursive terrain occupied by feminists is appropriated and reinflected to produce a
world not unlike the one to which the women’s movement of the mid-1960s rose up in response. It is a world in which women are regarded as helpless (in need of defense), vulnerable (in need of protection), powerless (in need of refuge), and “allowed” or expected to subordinate all aspects of their lives to their primary, divinely ordained purpose or natural function, the bearing and rearing of children. What Operation Rescue represents as its “feminist turn,” in other words, is an innate maternalism, paternalistically rendered, or a not-so-new variation, clearly, on an old and tired tune. It recasts women who seek abortions as helpless victims in need of protection and support and incapable of making such decisions for themselves while valorizing the deeds of the “born-again male hero” or “man-father-Father figure.” He acts on their behalf, for their sake, in their best interest, and one could presume, given the logic of paternalism, to check their (mistaken) convictions when necessary in order to “save [them] as well as [their] babies from the capacious maw of death.” Susan Harding, “If I Should Die before I Wake: Jerry Falwell’s Pro-Life Gospel,” in Uncertain Terms: Negotiating Gender in American Culture, ed. Faye D. Ginsberg and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (Boston: Beacon, 1990), 81.

A benevolent paternalism might be preferred to and certainly has greater popular appeal than a more punishing variety that condemns women who seek abortions as selfish, sinful, murderous, and dangerously unnatural—this was the view of women that Operation Rescue espoused prior to its “feminist” conversion. Paternalism may also seem neither aberrant nor irrational, but perfectly consistent within still-prevalent social and dominant legal understandings that see who and what women are and are for as physiologically rooted and determined. As legal scholar Reva Siegel observes, “Facts about women’s bodies [or what Siegel refers to as physiological naturalism], have long served to justify regulation enforcing judgements about women’s roles[, alleged needs, assumed wants, and supposed desires].” “Reasoning from the Body,” 277. In either case, however, whether benevolent or punitive, respectable or aberrant, Operation Rescue’s paternalism and the innate maternalism for which its “feminism” functions as a cover story would seem nevertheless to betray and perpetuate precisely what the majority opinion in Bray dismissed as erroneous: a basic attitude or animus toward women, indeed, a derogatory view of women that the record clearly shows could work and has worked, historically, in invidiously discriminatory or exclusionary ways.


15. In “traditional surrogacy,” the surrogate contributes genetic material, an egg; in gestational surrogacy, the surrogate makes no genetic contribution.

16. “It’s interesting in a way, when you relate that [hiring someone to ‘carry your child’] back to a practice that went on far into this century of women of means hiring young girls from the village to serve as wetnurses, and often times motherhood ended at birth as far as the work side of it, and I’m not sure anyone would argue that the person that nursed the child for a year from 7lbs to 30lbs got parental rights and became the
mother. It would be interesting to study the bonding psychology. . . . in those situations. There may still be wetnurses today, I don’t know. Anyway, I digressed.” Indeed. Trial transcript, *Johnson v. Calvert*, Office of the Supreme Court, California (1990), 1495.


18. Charles Murray, “The Coming White Underclass,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 29, 1993, A14. See also Murray’s “Stop Favoring Unwed Mothers,” *New York Times*, January 16, 1992, A23: “The problem is not that single mothers are on welfare, but that there are so many single mothers concentrated in poor communities. . . . The single-parent family does not work very well, even under the best of circumstances. . . . Children learn to be responsible adults by watching what responsible adults do. The absence of such examples for young men is especially dangerous. The violence and social chaos in the inner cities show us what happens when about half a generation of males is born to single women.

“The solution lies neither in social programs nor in making women on welfare go to work. It lies in restoring a situation in which almost all women either get pregnant after they get married or get married after they get pregnant. . . . Communities did not need lessons in how to bring these things about until welfare took over. But, to revitalize the natural mechanisms that used to work so effectively we have to come to terms with a fact that is unfashionable to acknowledge and palpably inequitable. For whatever complicated reasons—not least, because women bear children—communities have much more leverage over the woman’s behavior than the man’s.”


1 / Impaired Sight or Partial Vision?
Tracking Reproductive Bodies

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 61.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 70.


11. This reversal is set out and critically examined in Judith Butler’s masterful essay, “Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia,” in *Reading Rod-