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LANDSCAPING PALESTINE: REFLECTIONS OF ENCLOSURE IN A HISTORICAL MIRROR

When in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, and South African apartheid soon followed, it appeared even to political realists of the period that such systems, with their landscapes of walls and practices of separation, would rapidly be consigned to historical memory. In one of the great ironies of recent history, however, a new generation of such landscapes is proliferating in the wake of 1989, used by practitioners of power to promote systems of segregation and control movements of groups designated as threats by virtue of their representation as “other.” Reflecting collective psychologies of fear, these environments range from urban-based gated communities, where class prejudices against the poor and apprehension about crime coalesce in “fortified enclaves” within *Cities of Walls*, to borderlands between nation–states where hostility to immigrants and prejudices against ethnic others converge in creating what scholars describe as *The Wall Around the West*.¹ Despite differences, these landscapes share a similar aim: they use built environments as defensive fortifications to preempt the circulation of people across territorial space based on class, religious, and ethnic divides. In this way, gated communities in São Paulo and Los Angeles, the walled borderlands of Melilla and Ceuta separating the European Union from Africa, and the walled border of Operation Gatekeeper separating the United States from Mexico, are broadly comparable.

It can be argued that there is no environment in the world where these processes of partition and separation are being applied as formidably to the landscape as in Palestine. Here, the construction of Israeli settlements, protected by walls and checkpoints, has created a geography of impassible spaces where Palestinians are preempted from moving freely across their own territorial landscape to homes, work, and social activities. There is thus good reason for situating this fragmented geography within the framework of gatekeepers and wall builders so prolific in the world today. Yet, at the same time there is a compelling argument that this geography is more than a series of defensive fortifications characteristic of these other examples. What is occurring on the Palestinian landscape is a program of remaking land and shifting populations that is different from the partitioning of space in the walled borderlands, the gated communities, and the fortified enclaves of the post-1989 world. It is a landscape aimed at transforming the

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economy, demography, and culture of territorial space itself through a time-honored practice—the practice of *enclosure*.

PALESTINIAN LANDSCAPE IN A HISTORICAL MIRROR

As a geographical concept, “landscape” is a social product.² It represents the outcome of human interaction with human subjects and material objects that reorders the surface of land. Yet, landscape is more than a plot of ground. Landscape can also be understood as a “verb.”³ To “landscape” refers to a *process* in which human agency transforms what is occurring on land. Both product and process, landscapes are representations of the societies anchored to them and the relations of power that govern them. In this sense, the Palestinian landscape shares the essentials of other landscapes as a product transformed by processes of socioeconomic life and power while the landscaping of Palestine has created a territory with its own unique attributes.

Although the Palestinian landscape beckons to contemporary landscapes of fear for comparison, the fragmented Palestinian geography conforms more fundamentally to an older historical pattern. In this pattern, groups with power and territorial ambitions recast systems of ownership and stewardship on the landscape as they forge pathways to the modern world through two basic but invariably overlapping routes, one economic through capitalist industrialization, the other political through nationalist state building. At a fundamental level, both of these pathways to modern society are territorial. They involve sweeping changes on the land as the basis for the alternative socioeconomic and demographic order at the core of capitalist development and state building. This pattern of reordering landscape in making the modern world has a venerable lineage. One of its earliest and most storied examples is to be found in the enclosure landscape of early modern England.

By the mid-18th century in England, a “revolution” in the countryside was creating the single greatest change in the history of the English landscape.⁴ In an effort to expand farm output and generate higher rents from land, estate owners, backed by parliament, were aggressively abolishing rights of small tenant cultivators to use certain portions of estate land as a common resource. Farm sizes of large estates increased while numerous small tenants disappeared, consigned to the newly created large farms as wage earners or to new rural and urban industries as workers. The parliamentary enclosure acts that facilitated this process after 1750 completed a transformation in the system of land tenure initiated with earlier enclosures, from one in which tenant farmers had rights to use certain estate lands as a common resource to one in which common rights ceased and land came under the control of individuals. This “landlords’ revolution,” whereby rights to possess plots of ground as property had become more fully institutionalized, marked the beginning of “capitalist agriculture.”⁵ At the same time, these acts reshaped the countryside with miles of stone walls, hedges, and fences, barriers that gave the landscape its revolutionary character as a series of enclosed spaces.

While these barriers played a critical role as signs communicating the new territorial meaning of property rights, they assumed an equally crucial function as instruments enforcing a different system of circulation and trespass on the landscape.⁶ As material structures cast upon what had been open terrain, walls, hedges, and fences prevented the free movement of tenant cultivators across land associated with the open-field common

economy. In this way, human subjects, once accustomed to moving freely upon the land, now encountered a landscape that functioned as a mechanism of spatial discipline shaping where people could—and could not—go. This landscape, in turn, emphasizes how territorial space is not only an artifact of power but also an instrument that helps constitute power in the social order.⁷ By regimenting the movement of human bodies, as well as inscribing new meanings about property and trespass, these barriers on the landscape signaled the closure of the countryside.

ARGUMENT: THE RECURRENT PATTERN OF ENCLOSURE

Embedded in the enclosure landscapes of early modern England and Palestine today is a recurrent set of encounters between dominant groups and less powerful subalterns focusing on the interplay of power and territorial space. In assigning both landscapes to this lineage, this article draws on insights from Michel Foucault and theorists of *territoriality* about the spatial attributes of modern power. From this body of work emerges a narrative about the interplay of power and space as an ongoing theme in transitions to modern society.

For Foucault, modern society created a different set of imperatives for exercising power and maintaining the social order.⁸ In this new historical environment, power evolved into a more subtle but no less formidable mechanism for securing consent from the citizen-subjects of modern society. The paradigm for modern power was the practice in modern prisons of disciplining and regimenting individuals by controlling their spatial environs. In this way, power as a form of control over human beings emerged for Foucault as a thoroughly spatial phenomenon. Although theorists of territoriality draw upon this insight from Foucault about the interplay of power and space, they broaden it in two important ways: first by emphasizing the socially constructed character of geographical landscapes and the power of human agency in transforming geographical space, and second by acknowledging the role of subalterns in resisting power and thus helping shape territorial outcomes. In this body of work, territoriality is human action exercised on space. It refers to the efforts of individuals or groups “to affect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.”⁹ What emerges from the insights of Foucault and territorial theorists influenced by him is a narrative about the transition to modern society as a process with an underlying spatial logic replete with encounters between dominant and subaltern groups seeking control of landscapes. The landscape of Palestine today is part of this ongoing spatial history in which dominant groups and subalterns confront one another in an effort to impose and defend competing visions of life on the land.

With insights from Foucault and territoriality as theoretical frames, this article repositions the Palestinian landscape within a more enduring practice of power, the practice of enclosure, and reveals the basic features of this practice of remaking land in transitions to modernity. It draws upon the enclosures in 18th-century England as a foundation for uncovering patterns in the relationship of power to space in different historical environments, emphasizing how the project of state building launched by Zionists and the efforts of English landowners to recast the agrarian system in England along capitalist lines share a fundamental territorial aim on the landscape. By crafting the contours of

this ongoing and recurrent pattern, this article aims to uncover a historically general meaning in the landscape of Palestine today.

TOWARD A MODEL OF ENCLOSURE

As a recurring attribute of modern development, enclosure is used by dominant groups to consolidate systems of control over subalterns in an effort to recast the socioeconomic and demographic order on the landscape by reshaping landscape itself. This practice of taking control of landscape consists of two basic elements: a *legal* element that redefines property rights and imposes a different structure of sovereignty on territory by reorganizing systems of ownership, use, and circulation on the land; and *architectural* elements that communicate and reinforce the new legalities of property while recasting the land's physical contours. Enclosure is thus the application of force to land by groups with territorial ambitions who mobilize the institutional power of law and the material power of architecture to reorder patterns of land ownership, use, and circulation and reorganize socioeconomic life and demography in a place.

What ignites the passions for enclosure is a shift in outlook in which groups with territorial ambitions reimagine the character of land and reinvent notions of who is rightfully entitled to it. Such shifts in outlook, in turn, are part of a more generalized cultural process, described by Edward Said as *imaginative geography*.¹⁰ For Said, imaginative geography refers to the way actors with territorial ambitions reinvent meanings about the landscapes they covet and frame discourses justifying why they belong on, and are entitled to take control of, the landscapes they reinvent. Although conceding the incentives for territorial expansionism to be material, Said argues that the inspiration for controlling other places and people is rooted in culturally shaped attitudes and ideologies. He insists that reimagining landscapes—making new meanings about places—is but a first step to remaking them. Framing new meanings about geographical places is, in effect, the basis for a shift in outlook enabling groups with territorial ambitions to reimagine their place on, and rights to, territorial landscapes.

In England, this imagined geography emerged from an evolving discourse about property rights and land improvement that culminated in the work of John Locke (1690). Although landowners had been exposed to a discourse on the virtues of improving land since the 16th century,¹¹ Locke framed an argument more powerful than those of his predecessors in elevating land improvement to be the basis for rights to landed property.¹² This argument gave property owners a new rationale for aspiring to take control of common land. For Locke, land improvement was demarcated by cultivation, and cultivation entailed taking land out of common use. At the same time, “cultivating the earth”—what Locke described as taking land out of the commons and enclosing it—is what introduced private possession. By revealing private rights to property and collective uses of land to be incompatible and by insisting that collective uses interfered with imperatives to improve, Locke's work created a potent set of images of who belonged on the land and who was effectively trespassing on it. Predicated on an assessment of the commons as anathema to improvement, Locke's improvement-driven theory of rights to property undercut claims of commoners for rights of belonging on the landscape. At the same time, Locke's work provided estate owners with the arguments they needed for recasting

how land once given to collective uses could be remade to accommodate a narrower set of individual interests and ultimately transferred to their ownership and control.

In Palestine, enclosure began with an imagined geography first popularized in the late 19th century by Theodor Herzl to solve the problem of anti-Semitism by creating a state haven for the Jewish people. Similar to England, this imagined vision also represented a redefinition of property rights in seeking to remake the land where Palestinians resided. Although Zionism exploited the idea that Palestine *belonged* to the Jewish people by virtue of God's covenant with Abraham, Zionists envisioned a largely secular project, beginning with Herzl, who argued his case for a Jewish state in Palestine almost entirely in metaphors of modernization. In justifying Palestine for the project of building a Jewish state, Herzl characterized the Palestinian landscape as primitive, absent cultivation with low levels of development. European Jews, by contrast, with their experience of commerce and economic development, would improve this land. For Herzl, the depressed landscape, and the role he envisioned for Jewish settlers to cultivate and enhance it—alongside the moral legitimacy of Jewish statehood—conferred upon Zionists a right to the land of Palestine. In this way, Zionists crafted a redefinition of rights to land based on an imagined vision of Palestine as a landscape not only historically Jewish but also in need of development. Through their commitment to improving land, Zionists had a foundation for assuming control of the Palestinian landscape and altering its character from one in which Palestinians were its cultivators and stewards to one in which patterns of settlement, cultivation, and control on the landscape became Jewish.¹³

Once imbued with an imagined vision of belonging and entitlement to land, modern groups with territorial ambitions use the legal and architectural mechanisms of enclosure to impose new systems of sovereignty upon land and break existing patterns of occupancy, use, and socioeconomic relations on the landscape. These groups succeed in creating different systems of sovereignty on the landscape, however, by enlisting the support of a new institutional actor, the *state*. It is the state that assists dominant groups in the project of enclosure by recasting the legal systems governing how less powerful subalterns exist on, circulate across, own, and use land. This legal practice reconfigures lines of inclusion and trespass, effectively remapping where those with less power can circulate and what they can do on the land where they retain access. In addition, these legal practices facilitate the construction of building projects on the landscape that reinforce the new system of sovereignty on the land. In both cases, the state accelerates processes of enclosure already under way by using its power and authority to make enclosure a matter of public policy.

By establishing new systems of sovereignty on land and breaking existing socioeconomic patterns of ownership, occupancy, and circulation anchoring subalterns to the landscape, enclosure creates demographic impacts in the form of population *transfer*. Such movements of people are typically conceived as forced migrations from one location to another. Transfer, however, is not only an outcome of overt force involving a change in the location of populations. It is also a more subtle process involving a change in the social standing of populations. Often, these processes are interdependent, a change in status being the prelude to, or bound up with, a change in location. When enclosing land, dominant groups transfer populations by resorting to different gradients of force including outright expropriation, and by less overtly coercive measures, manipulating the conditions of existence on the land through application of the law and the

built environment, enabling populations to “choose” migration or alternative means of making a living as a remedy for enclosure. This process of moving populations spatially and socially to remake land is both a mechanism and a final goal of enclosure. When, in the wake of transfer, the anchors securing one group of people to land are weakened and a more powerful group assumes ownership and control of the land, and when the new group implements a different pattern of socioeconomic activities on the land, enclosure is achieved and land assumes a new identity.

Enclosure in England, by abrogating security of land tenure and in many cases dispossessing small commoners of rights to land, transferred members of this group from agrarian activities on the land anchored by common rights into different activities on the land connected to their new status as wage earners in both agriculture and rural handicraft. As the process of enclosure matured, many were driven from their rural environs all together into different locations as wage workers in an emerging urban industrial economy. In Palestine, Zionist-inspired enclosure after 1948 also transferred Palestinians from agrarian activities into wage earners inside Israel by “legally” dispossessing them of land and property.¹⁴ At the same time, enclosure spirited Palestinians to different locations, many outside the boundaries of historic Palestine, where they have assumed still another new status as refugees. In both cases, legal and physical changes grafted onto territory by those with power acted as catalysts for the process of transfer by altering rights of ownership and tenure on land, by changing how land can be used, and by restricting circulation across territorial space. What resulted was a change in the owners and cultivators of land, a change in the practices occurring on the land, and a transformation in the identity and meaning of landscape itself.

Such territorial outcomes, however, are not predetermined. Although power is unequal in these encounters over enclosure, it is interwoven into contingent relationships with less powerful subalterns that set in motion cycles of domination and *resistance*. Protests in English villages such as West Haddon in 1765 and Burton Latimer in 1808, when enclosure opponents tore apart and burned fences that enclosed their land and rerouted their movements on the landscape, find counterparts in Palestinian villages such as Budrus and Bil’in, where protestors have targeted the Wall, which has taken their land and prevented them from moving freely across the Palestinian landscape. Where elements of landscape play such a critical role in the exercise of power and domination, it is logical to find the landscape at the center of protest and resistance.¹⁵

ENCLOSING PALESTINE

Enclosing landscape in Palestine is a story driven by the passions of nationalism and a specific type of nation–state, which Oren Yiftachel terms an “ethnocracy.”¹⁶ This state has as its aim to “unmake” Palestine as Palestinian and to “redeem” it as Jewish. Such a project consists of changing the ethnoreligious character and identity of land, a process of “de-Arabising” and “Judaizing” Palestine. The historical geography of Palestine since 1947 attests to the thoroughness of this process of land redemption. In 1947, Jewish public agencies and private investors owned an estimated 6 to 8 percent of the land in Palestine, while Arab Palestinian society, including its public institutions, owned or controlled the rest. Today, these figures are essentially reversed.¹⁷ Although Palestinian territory is divided, one part the state of Israel, the other consisting of those portions of

Palestine occupied by this state, the process of enclosure and land redemption has been, and continues to be, a feature of the landscape common to both areas, emphasizing how the two are part of the same political and geographical unit.¹⁸

Nevertheless, redeeming land was not driven exclusively by issues of ethnoreligious identity. De-Arabising and Judaizing Palestine has also been an initiative of economic modernization.¹⁹ Combining ethnoreligious and economic objectives, land redemption has aimed to uproot a landscape of agrarian, industrial, and urban activities with a supposedly primitive Palestinian character and replace it with a landscape Jewish in identity and economically advanced in its agrarian and industrial practices and patterns of urbanization.

In this process of remaking landscape, state power has played a decisive role. Prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, the World Zionist Organization and its financial arm for the purchase of land in Palestine, the Jewish National Fund (JNF), functioned as a type of state in the making that spearheaded Zionist colonization. Nevertheless, by the start of the second wave of Jewish immigration in 1904, these organizations realized that ownership of land alone was insufficient for creating what they had imagined as a modern Jewish landscape. What emerged from this dilemma was the idea of controlling the labor market on land purchased in an effort to create an economy on the land of Jewish rather than Arab workers, a campaign referred to as the “conquest of labor.”²⁰ Although only partially successful at the outset, the conquest of labor largely prevailed by the mid-1930s as a tactical response to the dilemma of redeeming land and remaking landscape.

In 1936, at roughly the same time that the conquest of labor assumed a pivotal role as a tactic for land redemption, the remaking of land took another decisive turn that anticipated much of what is occurring today on the Palestinian landscape. Emerging during the Arab Revolt, this new pattern of redeeming land known as the Homa Umigdal project consisted of three basic elements: a settlement, a wall, and a guard tower.²¹ Although seemingly defensive, these settlements were part of a new offensive system of land development elaborated by the JNF, designed to seize control of land purchased in remote parts of the country and difficult to settle. They also had a clandestine character consisting of, first, a “conquering troop” that would descend on the targeted land at night and by morning complete the construction of the perimeter walls to preclude encroachment and, second, a guard tower to police the surroundings for what was considered hostile opposition.²² The idea was to create in a short time a chain of new settlements that would produce Jewish contiguity on the landscape. From 1936 to 1947 roughly 118 of these wall and tower settlements were established in Palestine, emerging as prescient signals for the type of landscape that would characterize the Zionist project in both Israel and the occupied territories in the years to come.

REMAKING LANDSCAPE

From the hill where the Palestinian town of Jayus is sited, a view to the flat plain below and nearby elevations reveals two architectural elements that tell a story about the redemption of land and the remaking of landscape. On an adjacent hilltop are the red roofs of Zufim, an Israeli settlement established in 1989 on land belonging to farmers from Jayus and now occupying an area six times its original size.²³ In the area of the

flat plain is perhaps the most arresting feature of the landscape, a long, barbed-wire fence bordered by coiled razor wire and bisected by a paved road. Forming an eighty-meter-wide barrier, this wall carves a harsh linear incision into an otherwise nonlinear landscape before disappearing at each end into the western horizon.²⁴ Both elements are part of more ambitious projects to alter the landscape. Zufim is but one of roughly 175 settlements arrayed throughout the West Bank, while the barrier near Jayus is a fragment of a (currently) 723-kilometer-long structure—barbed wire in Jayus, a concrete wall with military watchtowers in nearby Qalqilya.

These built forms of settlement and wall make two vital contributions to the program of enclosing and redeeming land. Embedded in the seemingly ubiquitous buildings with red roofs is a process of land confiscation in which Palestinian land is transferred into a new status as Israeli land. At the same time the settlement, as a gated community, functions as impassible space, off limits to its former owners. In a similar vein, the wall, and its accompanying element, the guard tower, embodies land taken from Palestinian owners, but its primary function is to establish and reinforce a system of impassible partitions on the landscape. Nevertheless, despite the capacity of elements in the built environment such as walls and settlements to function as overt instruments of land confiscation and restricted circulation, it is the legal power of the state that deploys these elements and enables the built environment to achieve such territorial effects.

From 1948 to 1967, this interplay of law and landscape architecture drove the redemption of territory inside Israel. Critical to this process was the passage of laws that circumscribed rights accorded to Arabs in the new state with a legally differentiated status as non-Jewish, undermining their claims to property and land. These laws created institutions empowered to seize and allocate land based on religious identity, facilitating the transfer of property from Arab to Jewish ownership.²⁵ In this sense, the law operated as proxy for what was actually a process of violence, the forcible movement of property from one group of people to another.²⁶ In this case, however, the law did more than transfer property. It created a different map of boundaries on the landscape corresponding to spaces of access and trespass, belonging and exclusion.²⁷ At the same time, the system of legality imposed on the landscape, and the force embedded in it, served as a foundation for exploiting the built environment as a territorial instrument by enabling structures such as settlements and walls to be built in the first place. In this way, land redemption emerged as a legal and architectural project.

During this period, land redemption inside Israel assumed two forms. One form consisted of taking the land belonging to people from the estimated 600 Palestinian towns abandoned during the formation of the Israeli state in 1948–49, which constituted 66 percent of the land seized from Palestinians inside Israel after they were driven from the territory.²⁸ Upon expropriation, this land was insulated from claims by its former Palestinian owners by the Absentee Property Law (1950), recast into a new legal status as Israeli state land by the State Property Law (1951), and as a final step to transforming the landscape, reallocated for the creation of new Jewish settlements. In this way, the interplay of law and construction framed a new Israeli cartography of Palestinian towns erased and replaced with 700 new Jewish settlements arrayed upon the landscape inside Israel, most of them on, or close to, the sites of the former Arab towns.²⁹

The other form of land redemption inside Israel corresponds to the land of Arab towns that survived the conflict of 1947–49 and remained within the Jewish state. From 1948

to 1966, these towns, most of which were located in the Northern Galilee, were placed under martial law. By the mid-1970s, the towns confronted a series of legal measures similar to those used on emptied villages, in which land belonging to Arab municipalities was expropriated, converted to state property, and reallocated for new Jewish settlement. In 1976, people from the Arab town of Sakhnin launched a series of protests against confiscation of 25,000 dunums of land belonging to farmers from the town, and during these actions six people were killed by Israeli soldiers and police.³⁰ These protests, however, were unable to halt the confiscations. By the 1980s, land taken from Sakhnin and the neighboring Arab villages of 'Arraba and Deir Hanna was reallocated to support creation of the nearby Jewish settlements of Yuvalim, Ashhar, Eshbal, Ma'aleh Tzviyah, Lotem, and Hararit. Today, Sakhnin's 25,000 residents control less than 10,000 dunums while the 15,000 residents of the new Jewish settlements control 180,000 dunums, including Sakhnin's former farm lands. Such policies have destroyed the fabric of Arab towns in Israel.³¹ With their land taken, and their environs occupied by new Jewish settlements, towns such as Sakhnin now form isolated urban enclaves, disconnected from linkages to their agricultural fields and to other Arab towns.

Owing to these processes of fragmentation and confiscation, the role of Arab towns in Israel as nodes in urban systems—the rural–urban and interurban networks of production, trade, and communications that sustain economic and social life—has been transformed. With the contraction of Palestinian agriculture, which historically supplied the basic commodities sustaining these networks,³² the Arab town in Israel and its inhabitants now function in a system of linkages increasingly redirected toward Israeli Jewish settlements. The result is that Palestinians in Israel have emerged more dependent on wage work, mostly inside the Jewish settlements, a process of social transfer known as “the proletarianization of agrarian communities.”³³ At the same time, a landscape of Jewish towns and settlements creating its own pattern of interurban and rural–urban trade has replaced the interurban and urban–rural linkages of Palestinian society while spawning an urban-based industrial structure linked to the advanced economies. Removed in this process were the farms anchoring Palestinian agriculture. In their place emerged the kibbutz and moshav, and when these agrarian institutions faltered, large-scale agro-industrial farms, which now dominate the agrarian landscape inside Israel. This process of enclosure has uprooted the socioeconomic anchors affixing one group of people to place, while anchors affixing another group to territory and corresponding to a different pattern of agrarian, urban, and industrial development have been driven into the landscape.

Such policies of land redemption are essentially duplicated in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, where a system of ethnoreligious-based property rights favoring Jews has been strengthened by martial law as well as by selective manipulation of older Ottoman land laws. With these legal frameworks, the Israeli government has empowered itself with wide-ranging authority to reclassify Palestinian land and convert it into property belonging to the state of Israel. At the same time, the built environment, much like in Israel itself, extends and completes this legal power, casting what Jeff Halper terms a “matrix of control” over territory to reinforce a legal process for redeeming and enclosing land.³⁴ This matrix consists first of at least 175 Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It is complemented by a network of roads linking these Jewish-only enclaves and connecting them to the urban system inside Israel, policed by internal checkpoints to

protect these settlements and through which Palestinian access within and across their own territory is controlled and restricted. This environment of built forms is now being extended most visibly by the Wall, which is remapping the spaces in which Palestinians live, work, and circulate.³⁵

MOVING POPULATIONS

In Jayus, Salah is a small farmer growing vegetables, guava, and olives, but what he does for the other farmers in the town reveals much about agrarian life in Palestine and the pressures confronting the agrarian landscape due to enclosure. In addition to tending his land, Salah keeps the accounts for the irrigation system that provides water to the farms of Jayus and is the field hand adjusting the valves and pipes that allocate water to these family-based units. Agriculture in Jayus, he explains, is organized as a *cooperative*.³⁶ Although privately owned, farms share water as a common resource. In addition, where Salah does his work monitoring the valves and pipes, the fields are open, absent physical barriers. In many ways, Jayus is a microcosm of Palestinian agrarian life. Sustained by intimate linkages between the family, the village, and the land, this system blurs the lines between work and the village; social interaction based on extended family relations and a culture of reciprocity is replicated in the fields and reinforced by an open spatial organization within the fields and between the village and its surrounding farms. Imprinted upon the landscape, these patterns of economic and social life anchor Palestinians to place.

In Jayus, however, as in other Palestinian towns where the instruments of enclosure, notably, the Wall, have been grafted upon the landscape, these patterns of economy and society are becoming more difficult to sustain. “Two years ago I was sleeping on my farm in summer so that I did not have to pass from my house in the village through the checkpoint at the Wall to get to my fields every day,” explained Shareef, who with 200 dunums is the largest farmer in Jayus. “This year [2008], Israeli authorities prohibited me from sleeping on my farm, claiming I was a security risk, and they would not issue me a permit to pass through the checkpoint. I became a farmer without my land.” For Shareef, the aim of the Wall and the system of territorial fragmentation deriving from it is obvious. “They want to make it impossible for me to live,” he insisted. “They want me to leave, to go *out*.”³⁷

Despite resistance to these tactics through practices of “steadfastness” (*sumūd*), what is creating pressures on farmers such as Shareef to leave are the ways in which the system of land redemption is targeting three anchors of Palestinian identity affixing Palestinians to landscape. One anchor, the farm, is central to economic life. A second anchor, the home, is the basis of the family and social life. The third anchor, the village, town, or city where economic and social life is organized, is vital in the networks of production, trade, and communications sustaining the Palestinian economy and society. That these three institutions have come to play such a vital role in anchoring Palestinian identity to landscape and place derives from circumstances that have imbued Palestinians, even prior to 1947–48, with strong local loyalties, involving “the intense attachment of the urban population to their cities and towns and of the peasantry to their villages and lands.”³⁸ Farm, home, and municipality have emerged as the anchors of identity—and

TABLE 1. *Israeli settlement population and land confiscation in occupied Palestine*

	1972	1977	1986	1992	1999	2007
West Bank	1,182	4,323	55,690	105,484	180,335	276,462
E. Jerusalem	9,200	33,300	103,900	141,100	170,400	189,708
Gaza	700	700	2,150	4,300	6,600	
Total settlers	11,082	38,323	161,740	250,884	357,335	466,170
Cumulative total land confiscated (West Bank/ Gaza = 5,950,000 dunums) ^a			38.5%	45.1%	49.5%	56.5%

^aApproximations are based on data from the following sources.

Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace (various tables) http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/comprehensive-settlement-population-1972-2006 (accessed 26 September 2009); Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), *Economic Monitor*, no. 10 (2003), table 1/1, p. 59; Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), 177; COHRE Center on Housing Rights and Evictions and BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, *Ruling Palestine: A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine* (2005), 112–16.

as targets in the process of remaking land. If, as the promoters of enclosure have long affirmed as part of their own ideology, it is the transfer of populations that makes possible the remaking of land, and if the transfer of populations requires dislodging the anchors that secure people to place, then it is logical that the route to transfer and remaking land would pass through those anchors attaching Palestinians to place.

There are three ways that enclosure has weakened the farm, home, and town. One is by fragmenting land. The second is by confiscating land. The third is by overt destruction of the cultivated and material artifacts on the land. These policies of fragmentation, confiscation, and destruction targeting the farm, home, and town aim at one principal objective—the transfer of the Palestinian population in order to complete the process of redeeming and enclosing land.

Erasing the Farm

As in Israel, the institution of Jewish settlement drives enclosure in the occupied territories. Conceived as policy shortly after 1967, settling Israeli citizens in occupied Palestine began in 1972 and in the West Bank has expanded unabated to the present day, resulting in a diminishing land inventory for Palestinians (Table 1). In this effort to establish settlements, Israel has taken control of more than 50 percent of the land in the West Bank by means of a complex legal and administrative process as well as by overt methods of force. The overwhelming bulk of the property taken for Israeli settlement has been the land of Palestinian farms.³⁹

The central element in this redistribution of land from Palestinian farms to Jewish settlements is a legal and administrative process for declaring and registering land in Palestine as Israeli “state land.”⁴⁰ This process utilizes two basic mechanisms. It takes advantage of an older legal framework, the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, which

permitted peasant cultivators in Palestine to register their land and gain secure tenure to it, while enabling Ottoman rulers to take control of land considered uncultivated (*mīrī*) or unused (*mawāt*) in order to reallocate it and promote cultivation on it that could then be taxed. The law survived successive British and Jordanian rule but the Israeli Occupation Administration has used this framework for land confiscation quite differently. What Israel has aimed to do through the Ottoman Land Law is evade overt confiscation of private Palestinian land for development of settlements in favor of a legal process for land seizure that enables the state to assume control over unused, uncultivated, or vacant land so that it can be reallocated for settlements.⁴¹

Reflecting this approach to the law is the sentiment of Ron Nahman, mayor of the Israeli settlement of Ariel. “When we built Ariel,” he explained, “we never took one square inch of land from anybody.” He went on to emphasize that “this land didn’t belong to anyone; it was empty.” Nahman then made a further observation: “show me the document that says the land here belonged to them [Palestinians].”

This argument of Nahman reveals the second mechanism used by the Israeli administration in occupied Palestine—the requirement for Palestinians to produce title to their land. The problem is that much of the land farmed historically by Palestinians is without documentation. Under British and Jordanian rule, a process of land registration, continuing in the spirit of the Ottoman Land Law, was initiated to enable Palestinian farmers in the West Bank to acquire title to their land, but the program remained incomplete even by 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and halted the process. Palestinian land absent title, as interpreted by the Israeli Occupation Administration, has no ownership and thus becomes classifiable as unused or uncultivated, perched at all times on the precipice of legal confiscation.

If, however, Israel has utilized a legal framework to avoid appearances of seizing private land, it has nevertheless failed even by its own standards to safeguard Palestinian property rights, revealing the second mechanism for land transfer—overt force. Roughly 40 percent of the land currently occupied by Israeli settlements in the West Bank is private Palestinian property that, according to Israeli law, has been seized and transferred illegally.⁴² As a consequence, owing to both “legal” and extralegal land seizures, mayors of West Bank towns tell the same story of how land belonging to local residents has been confiscated, transferred to the fund for Israeli state lands, and allocated for Jewish settlement.⁴³ “We used to have 7,800 dunums of land,” explained ‘Ali Mustafa Shosha, manager of the village council for the town of Husan. “From 1982–86, Israeli authorities confiscated 5,200 dunums of land belonging to our farmers to build the settlement of Beitar Illit. After the settlement was built, we were left with 2,400 dunums.”⁴⁴ The aggregate result has been a gradual transfer of land from the Palestinian farm to Israeli settlements.

The Palestinian farm has also declined due to the construction impacts of the Wall, a process that has destroyed the livelihood of Ahmad Muhammad Ibdah, a farmer from Marda in the shadow of Ariel. Ibdah insists on beginning his story about the Wall in 1978, however, when he lost twenty dunums of land to confiscation during construction of the Ariel settlement. “This was theft,” he insisted. On 30 May 2005, Ibdah saw his farm vanish for good, after he and others from the village found notices hung in their olive trees by the Israeli army outlining plans to take their land for new security measures in Marda. “They destroyed 100 of my trees on ten dunums of my land,” he recounted.

“Another 300 of my olive trees now lie on the Ariel side of the Wall, which I cannot reach.”⁴⁵

The fate of Ibdah also emphasizes how a third element of enclosure, the destruction of crops, most notably, olive trees, is undermining the Palestinian farm. From 1994 through September of 2009, the Israeli army and contractors working for settlements uprooted 412,000 olive trees worth \$104 million in occupied Palestine.⁴⁶ Because olive cultivation occupies slightly over 50 percent of the agricultural land area,⁴⁷ olives and olive trees permeate Palestinian economic and cultural life. As a consequence, the destruction of olive trees has broad import. It is a form of cultural as well as economic aggression aimed at eradicating those elements of material and cultural life that enable Palestinians to imagine their place on the landscape.

This eradication of olive trees and confiscation of land stemming from the Wall emphasize still another ongoing theme of enclosure aimed at undermining the viability of the Palestinian farm—the shrinkage of land under cultivation. Such reductions in cultivated land stem from two sources. The first source corresponds to the *direct effects* of the Wall on the landscape and consists of the confiscation of land and the destruction of the trees and crops on it for construction. The second source corresponds to *indirect effects*. These impacts stem from land rendered inaccessible as a result of the placement route of the barrier and the permit regime that enables or prohibits Palestinians to pass from their homes, through gates in the Wall, to their fields. This framework reveals how the Palestinian farm is disappearing.

The direct effects of the Wall throughout the West Bank have resulted in the confiscation of roughly 62,890 dunums of land.⁴⁸ In terms of the indirect effects, mayors from Palestinian towns report that anywhere from 25 to 50 percent of residents with land on the Israeli side of the Wall are unable to access their lands because they cannot obtain permits to pass through the Wall to their fields.⁴⁹ In the Qalqilya area, the average monthly rejection rate for permit applications is 37 percent.⁵⁰ “Most families in Jayus cannot get permits,” insists Abu Samah, the former mayor of Jayus. “I have sixty dunums beyond the Wall,” he said, “but for ‘security reasons,’ I cannot get a permit to go to my land. A friend takes care of my citrus trees, but I am obliged to give him one third of the crop.”⁵¹

These towns from the Qalqilya area reveal a 20 percent reduction in cultivated land since 2002 owing to direct and indirect impacts of the Wall. In neighboring Tulkarem, land under cultivation fell by 24 percent.⁵² When such impacts are multiplied throughout the occupied territories in communities where the Wall passes, they point to the ongoing erosion of the Palestinian farm and a continuous push of the Palestinian farmer into ever-smaller spaces for sustaining economic life.

Demolishing the Home

If destroying farms has been an ongoing practice on the Palestinian landscape, so too is demolishing Palestinian homes, an activity central to Israel’s project of land redemption since 1948.⁵³ Inside Israel, this practice has assumed two forms. In the period of state formation, thousands of Palestinian homes, abandoned when residents were expelled, were demolished as hundreds of villages were razed. Since that time, home demolition inside Israel has continued to occur. As a result of the frequent inability of Israeli Arabs

to obtain permits from local district-planning authorities to expand their houses or to build anew, they are forced to build housing illegally. If Israeli planning and building authorities discover such home construction, however, they can—and at times do—demolish the house. Such practices, even when they do not lead to tearing down a home, deter Palestinians from building due to the fear of demolition.⁵⁴

These policies are enforced in an even more draconian fashion in the occupied territories, where the Israeli armed forces use three legal classifications to demolish Palestinian homes: *punitive* demolitions carried out as punishment for the actions of individuals associated with the house, *military* demolitions carried out when the Israeli army declares a security concern in the area or when infrastructure such as a road or the Wall requires land to be cleared and a house is occupying such land, and *administrative* demolitions carried out when Palestinians build “illegally” and fail to secure building permits. According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, from 1967 to 2009, roughly 24,000 houses were demolished in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.⁵⁵

Salim Shawamreh of ‘Anata near Jerusalem is one such statistic. After numerous attempts at securing a building permit for his house, Shawamreh, like many Palestinians in similar circumstances, constructed a house for his family in 1994 on a small, one-dunum plot of land in ‘Anata he had purchased near the Jerusalem municipal boundary. “We do our best to get building permits,” he insisted, “but they don’t give them to Palestinians.” In 1998, Israeli military personnel came unannounced to his home, arrested him, and demolished the house because it had been constructed without a permit. Attempting to remain steadfast after such a catastrophe, Shawamreh rebuilt his demolished house. It was demolished again. He rebuilt it twice more—with the same result. Finally, compelled to rent an apartment in nearby Beit Hanina, Shawamreh characterized his experience as one of forced migration. “By demolishing your house,” said Shawamreh, “they send you the clearest message possible: ‘We do not want you here. Find another place to live.’ This is a policy of quiet transfer.”⁵⁶

The focus on home demolitions has more recently shifted to East Jerusalem, where settler groups, assisted by the Israeli government and the courts, are aiming to extend Jewish settlement. Similar to the situation in the West Bank, the issue at the center of these demolitions in East Jerusalem is “illegal” construction.⁵⁷ Since 1967, when Israel annexed East Jerusalem (in contrast to the West Bank, which it occupies) and incorporated it into the administrative fabric of the Jerusalem municipality, Israeli authorities have demolished roughly 2,000 houses in East Jerusalem on the pretext of building and zoning violations. Roughly 33 percent of this annexed area has been expropriated for construction of Jewish settlements, but only 13 percent of East Jerusalem is zoned by Israeli zoning authorities for Palestinian residential construction. As a consequence, there is a critical shortage of land in East Jerusalem for housing Palestinians who are left with few options but to build where they are. The problem is that Palestinians in East Jerusalem, much like those in the West Bank, are routinely denied building permits and are thus forced to build “illegally.” The UN estimates that at least 28 percent of all housing in East Jerusalem, representing 60,000 Palestinian residents, is in violation of the building and zoning requirements imposed by Israel and faces the possibility of demolition. One such house recently demolished was that of Amar Salameh al-Hdaidun. In this case, the area where the al-Hdaiduns were living was rezoned by the Jerusalem authorities as a “green area” where housing was prohibited. Since 2004, the al-Hdaiduns

had attempted to work with the Jerusalem authorities, spending \$45,000 on plans and maps in an effort to change the zoning back to residential but to no avail. On 22 April 2009, bulldozers arrived at the home of the al-Hdaiduns. By the end of the day, they were homeless.⁵⁸

Fragmenting the Town

The demolition of homes in East Jerusalem and the isolation of its residents signal how a third anchor of Palestinian society is being weakened, the Palestinian town. Cities thrive not only as concentrations of resources fixed at a single locality but also as nodes of connection to hinterlands and other cities. What has emerged from the interplay of law and built forms on the Palestinian landscape is a system of disconnection in the interurban and rural–urban networks of the Palestinian urban system and the creation of a geography of partitioned and isolated enclaves.

There are eleven major urban enclaves in the West Bank: Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Jericho, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, South Hebron, and the Jordan Valley.⁵⁹ Measures such as the permit system, which regulates flows of goods and people between places, frame a legal architecture for these enclaves by preempting the movement of goods and people between certain points. At the same time, checkpoints, the Wall, and roads linking settlements frame a physical architecture for these enclaves by creating physical obstacles to movement.

How this fractured urban system undermines the Palestinian town and networks of economic and social life is illustrated by the situation of Al-Haya Foods, a meat-processing firm located in Ezaria, a Palestinian town adjacent to East Jerusalem. “Historically, much of our business was in East Jerusalem,” explained Banan Khatib, managing director of Al-Haya. “Now what we are confronting is a new market geography throughout the West Bank.”

In order to service shops in East Jerusalem, we have to travel halfway to Jericho. . . . Instead of a trip taking five minutes, the trip takes one hour. Consequently, our market in East Jerusalem has shrunk because we have no access there and the people have no access to our goods. Furthermore, labor markets in the West Bank are now completely fragmented. For some of our workers, we have had to rent flats here [Ezaria] because some of them live far from the facility and could not get to our plant. The whole system is a complete rupture of communications.⁶⁰

ARCHITECTURES OF ENCLOSURE

On a geographical level, what has emerged from these efforts to erase, demolish, and fragment is a landscape of impassible partitions interspersed with homes destroyed and farmland uprooted.⁶¹ Although the legal regime of enclosure ultimately creates this geography, enclosure depends heavily on elements of architecture to establish the facts of erasure, demolition, and fragmentation on the landscape. Three architectural elements play a particularly decisive role in creating such facts on the landscape: the checkpoint, the settlement, and the Wall. As territorial instruments, these elements immobilize and restrict movement in and across space, encroach into and confiscate space, and finally undermine and destroy economic activity while creating economic dead zones in space.

Arguably, the architectural element most representative of the geography of fragmentation and immobility is the checkpoint, affecting both human circulation and traffic in goods. These fixtures on the landscape range from large terminals for human processing such as Qalandia, to more modest collections of barriers and obstructions such as Jabara near Tulkarem, to simple but immovable concrete blocks placed on roadways to preempt cars from accessing certain routes to and from towns such as ‘Azzun near Qalqilya. As nodes in a vast network, checkpoints create a grid of partitioned spaces on the landscape where connection to and from these partitions occurs only through heavily policed corridors. In these corridors, Palestinians encounter friction, mostly in the form of long waits imposed by enclosure authorities before passage to an adjacent spatial cell is possible, while in some instances friction results from the physical attributes of the architecture itself: a closed gate, a wall that cannot be breached. Where Palestinians encounter this friction, they form “camps,” clusters of human beings immobilized and impeded from moving.⁶² At any one moment, hundreds of these camps are distributed across the landscape. What the checkpoint does by immobilizing people and goods is create severe distortions in the relationship of distance and time for Palestinians as well as for products moving from one point to another. Its consequence is that the time needed to cover distance is open ended, while distance is abstracted from any meaningful linear measure. What is normally a twenty-kilometer trip from Bethlehem to Ramallah represents an always unknowable increment of time created by delays at checkpoints. When checkpoints on this trip become completely impassible, temporal uncertainty takes the form of an alternate route that transforms a twenty-kilometer trip into a sixty-kilometer, three-hour excursion. Such uncertainty reinforces immobility. The trip not taken to visit family or friends because of what may be encountered at the checkpoint is as much a part of the geography of immobility as the camp itself.

The checkpoint as an instrument of immobility, however, assumes its role in conjunction with the element enforcing most profoundly the geography of encroachment and displacement, the Israeli settlement. Occupying innumerable West Bank hilltops, settlements create a system of impassible zones that fragment the Palestinian landscape. While the Palestinian agrarian village generally occupies the middle- to upper-middle portion of the hilly terrain characteristic of the region, leaving the hilltop for agriculture, grazing, or in some instances public space, Israeli settlement covets hilltops for the built-up area of its towns in occupying the landscape’s commanding heights. Nowhere is this contrast more obvious than in the area of Salfit, where Ariel, a large Israeli settlement, sits atop several Palestinian villages. As settlements become increasingly implanted throughout the territory, and as the infrastructure to support them, primarily roads, gets built, they take more land. At the same time, as settlements in the West Bank increase and expand, so too do the efforts to control the circulation of Palestinians in and around these areas. The checkpoint thus emerges as an increasingly ubiquitous element of landscape corresponding to the ubiquity of the settlements themselves.

Although the Wall plays a role in the geography of immobility and destruction, its role in creating economic *dead zones*, spaces of commercial and industrial depression, is less understood. Proliferating throughout the West Bank, the dead zone emerges as a space where the Wall and the sixty- to eighty-meter “seam” around it come into direct proximity with commercial establishments, extinguishing the economic life of such businesses while imbuing the area nearby with a depressed, abandoned character. One

of the clearest examples of this phenomenon is the Jerusalem-Hebron Road at the western entrance to Bethlehem. Once vibrant, the area is now bounded by a large checkpoint terminal and surrounded by the Wall, many of its shops closed. Isam Albandek, the owner of Albandek Marble and Stone, describes how the Wall forty meters from his facility is destroying his livelihood. "If you look out the window," he asks, "what do you see?"

It is completely dead here. There is no traffic, no people, no transport, no *business*. Customers who used to visit our factory do not come anymore because they either cannot come here, or they are afraid to come. And employees don't want to work here because it is difficult to get here . . . Where the Wall comes, it makes dead areas.⁶³

LINEAGES OF ENCLOSURE

Enclosure on the Palestinian landscape is part of a historically enduring interplay of power and space. As a set of territorial encounters, enclosure consists of practices developed by dominant groups to consolidate systems of control over subalterns in an effort to recast the socioeconomic and demographic order by remaking the landscape. The remaking of landscape plays a decisive role in the two primary, overlapping, and complementary routes to the modern world, capitalist development and nationalist state building. This common territorial lineage in the two basic routes to modernity is what enables the enclosure landscape in Palestine to find an echo in other historical landscapes of enclosure. This article addresses questions of what made the recasting of landscapes a critical part of modernity and how the remapping of space conformed to the aims of modern power holders, from English landowners to Israeli nationalists.

What motivates dominant groups to remake the territorial space where less powerful groups work and live is a process of "imagining" landscape. In this process, groups with power construct ideologies justifying why they are the rightful owners and stewards of the land. These ideologies, in turn, provide arguments for revisions in systems of property rights based on beliefs about who is rightfully entitled to the land. Once groups with power are convinced of their entitlement to land, they exploit their dominant position over groups of people already on the land to carry out a program of redefining the land's rightful owners and occupants. In the process, they modify legal conventions of land ownership, access, and use and recast built forms on the landscape to reinforce these new legalities on the land. These two instruments—law and landscape architecture—enable groups with territorial ambitions to transfer populations to and from land and install themselves as the land's legitimate owners. This pattern of using systems of legality and instruments of the built environment to move populations and remake landscape, and the forms of resistance to this pattern, are the basis of enclosure. What emerges from enclosure is a different structure of ownership and control over land, a new pattern of demography, and a different set of socioeconomic practices anchored to the landscape.

In addition to crafting new theory about the continuity of enclosure, this study also serves a worldly function in challenging claims made by enclosure practitioners in Palestine about the uniquely beleaguered nature of their society as the rationale for enclosing Palestinian land. The enclosure policies practiced by the state of Israel, far from being driven exclusively by circumstances in the region, derive equally from longstanding territorial tendencies of modern power. The promoters of enclosure in

Palestine are, in effect, little different from other dominant groups. In reimagining and remaking land, Israeli nationalists have acted in much the same way as English landowners acted toward the less powerful when the latter became an obstacle to realizing their ideologically driven territorial aims. Both groups with power remade the landscape at the expense of the less powerful in order to realize an imagined vision.

Enclosure is not a predetermined process. Resistance is part of an ongoing relationship between dominant and subordinate groups that shapes how enclosure is eventually implemented. The extent to which resistance will alter outcomes of enclosure on the Palestinian landscape, however, remains to be seen. The story is far from over.

NOTES

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³W. J. T. Mitchell, *Landscape and Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 1.

⁴W. G. Hoskins, *The Making of the English Landscape* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), 177–78; Ann Bermingham, *Landscape and Ideology: The English Rustic Tradition* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1986), 9; Oliver Rackham, *The History of the Countryside* (London: J. M. Dent, 1986), 190–91.

⁵On property as plots of ground controlled by individuals, see Michael Turner, "Parliamentary Enclosures: Gains and Costs," *Refresh* 3 (1986): 5–8, <http://www.ehs.org.uk/society/pdfs/Turner%203b.pdf> (accessed 25 September 2009). On the landlords' revolution and capitalist agriculture, see Robert C. Allen, *Enclosure and the Yeoman: The Agricultural Development of the South Midlands* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 5.

⁶This paragraph draws from Nicholas Blomley, "Making Private Property: Enclosure, Common Right and the Work of Hedges," *Rural History* 18 (2007): 5; Jeanette Neeson, *Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700–1820* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5.

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⁸See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Pantheon, 1977), esp. 195–256; and Chris Philo, "Michel Foucault," in *Key Thinkers on Space and Place*, ed. Phil Hubbard, Rob Kitchin, and Gill Valentine (London: Sage, 2002), 121–28.

⁹Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 19. For the influence of Foucault among this group, see *ibid.*, 179–83; Joanne Sharpe et al., eds., *Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination and Resistance* (London: Routledge, 2000); and Chandra Mukerji, *Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

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¹⁷Graham Usher, “Unmaking Palestine: On Israel, the Palestinians, and the Wall,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35 (2005): 25–43, esp. 27.

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¹⁹See especially Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*; Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of Dedevelopment* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995).

²⁰See especially Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1996).

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²⁴I use the term “wall” in accordance with the terminology used to denote the barrier in the legal opinion of the International Court of Justice ruling of 9 July 2004, entitled *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71&code=mwp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6&case=131&k=5a> (accessed 24 November 2009).

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²⁶On the association of law with violence, see Nicholas Blomley, “Law, Property and the Geography of Violence,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 93 (2003): 121–41.

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³⁰Interview with Razal Abu Raich, member of the Sakhnin Village Council, Sakhnin, 28 December 2003. See also Jonathan Cook, “The Freedom to Take our Land,” *Al-Ahram Weekly* 632 (2003): 3–9.

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³⁴Jeff Halper, "The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control," in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*, ed. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin (New York: New Press, 2002), 20–40.

³⁵This matrix also includes control of Palestinian water sources by Israel. See Palestinian Hydrology Group, *Water for Life: Israeli Assault on Palestinian Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene During the Intifada* (Ramallah, 2004).

³⁶Interview with author, Jayus, 2 August 2006.

³⁷Interview with author, Jayus, 15 July 2008.

³⁸Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 20–21.

³⁹The exceptions to this pattern are the settlements in the Jordan Valley, where Palestinians had limited agriculture, and parts of East Jerusalem. See B'tselem, *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank* (Jerusalem, 2002), 91–116.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 8, 47.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 47–64.

⁴²See Dror Etkes and Hagit Ofra, Peace Now Report, *Breaking the Law in the West Bank: Israeli Settlement Building on Private Palestinian Property* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 2006).

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⁴⁴Interview with author, Husan, 24 July 2006.

⁴⁵Interview with author, Marda, 5 August 2005.

⁴⁶E-mail correspondence with Dr. Jad Issac, director general of the Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem, 19–20 October 2009.

⁴⁷Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Agriculture Statistics Annual Report 2008*, <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/DesktopModules/Articles/ArticlesView.aspx?tabID=0&lang=en&ItemID=1410&mid=10945> (accessed 5 September 2009).

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⁴⁹See also B'tselem, *Not all it Seems: Preventing Palestinians Access to Their Land West of the Separation Barrier in the Tulkarem/Qalqilya Area* (2004), 11.

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⁵¹Interview with author, Jayus, 3 August 2006.

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⁵⁵Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, <http://www.icahd.org/eng/articles.asp?menu=6&submenu=2&article=517> (accessed 25 September 2009).

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⁵⁷Statistics in this paragraph are from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Occupied Palestinian Territories), *The Planning Crisis in East Jerusalem: Understanding the Phenomenon of "Illegal" Construction* (Jerusalem, 2009), http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_planning_crisis_east_jerusalem_april_2009_english.pdf (accessed 19 September 2009).

⁵⁸Isabel Kershner, "UN Seeks End to Razing of Homes in East Jerusalem," *New York Times* (1 May 2009): A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/world/middleeast/01jerusalem.html?_r=2&ref=world (accessed 19 September 2009).

⁵⁹United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Territorial Fragmentation of the West Bank* (2006).

⁶⁰Interviews with author, Ramallah, 25 December 2004, and Ezaria, 27 December 2004.

⁶¹For a comprehensive analytical description of the architecture and built environment of the Israeli occupation, see Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007).

⁶²I am indebted to Adi Opher for this insight about checkpoints as camps.

⁶³Interview with author, Beit Jala, 31 July 2005.