Enclosure: Palestinian Landscape in a “Not-Too-Distant Mirror”

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Abstract This article develops an explanation for the fractured and partitioned landscape in Palestine by comparing it to the early modern enclosures in England, and framing this comparison within a theory of “territoriality.” Territoriality is a practice of power and refers to the efforts of individuals or groups to reorganize the economic life, politics, and culture of a place by reshaping landscape. The argument is that the Palestinian landscape is part of a long-standing narrative in which groups with power seek to transform the economy, demography, and culture of territorial space through the time-honored territorial practice of enclosing land. Enclosure consists of two basic instruments: a legal element that redefines rights of property by reorganizing systems of use, access, and socio-economic relations on the land; and architectural elements that reshape the landscape itself. English estate owners and Israeli Zionists are parallel actor groups using law and the built environment to remake life on the landscape. Mobilizing the institutional power of property law and the material power of the built environment, these groups reorder land ownership, use, and circulation on the landscape in an effort to consolidate systems of control over subalterns and reorganize socio-economic life and demography in a place. By exploring the contours of this pattern, this article seeks to uncover a more general meaning in the enclosure landscape of Palestine today.

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If Michel Foucault was still present and able to observe the partitioned landscape and disciplined ordering of Palestinian subjects at the Qalandia checkpoint near Ramallah in the Palestinian West Bank, he would likely find a disturbing affirmation to his genealogy of power in the modern world. According to Foucault, modern power has as its basic principle the “distribution of bodies” in space (Foucault, 1977: 202). This tendency of modern power to order human activity by controlling the spatial environments where such activity takes place, emerged as part of a social formation he termed “disciplinary society.” Originating in the 18th century, disciplinary society pioneered mechanisms of social control by extending the techniques of surveillance and regimentation developed within modern prisons into the general fabric of society, and by converting the social and even physical spaces where people work and live into spaces of enclosure. While Foucault may have been taken aback by the overtly brutal, supposedly pre-modern forms of power imposed at Qalandia alongside the more subtle panoptic practices of domination he associated with modernity, he nevertheless understood how modern power was a fundamentally spatial phenomenon (Philo, 2002: 121–128).
In what ways is the Palestinian landscape observable at Qalandia part of a broader historical project associated with what Foucault termed, disciplinary society? This article addresses this question by situating this landscape within a longstanding narrative about the interplay of power and space, and comparing it to the landscape of the enclosures in England of the late 18th century.

Throughout England after 1750, a revolution in the countryside was rendering much of the landscape unrecognizable compared to what it had been centuries earlier (Hoskins, 1977: 178; Bermingham, 1986: 9). In order to make their estates more profitable, estate owners were aggressively abolishing rights of small tenant cultivators to use certain portions of estate land as a common resource. In the process, many small cultivators who relied on such rights for survival and were already under economic pressure, were forced into new roles, consigned to the enlarged estates as wage earners or as laborers in newly established rural and urban industries. Others who labored on the estate directly for the owner but who had supplemented part time wage work with income from grazing animals on common land now found that income eliminated and had no choice but to become full time wage workers. In this way, one group of people anchored to the landscape through a system of legal and customary rights, was transferred to a new social status and in some instances other locations where they assumed both a new status as well as a different economic role.

What facilitated these changes on the landscape was Parliamentary Enclosure, legal Acts that completed a transformation in the system of land tenure from one in which occupants had rights to use designated land in common, to one in which land came under the control of individuals (Turner, 1986). At the same time, this legal change reshaped the landscape with miles of stone walls, hedges, and fences, built by those enclosing land not only to demarcate their enlarged holdings, but also to restrict circulation on what was once an open landscape with rights to use certain land as a shared resource. These material barriers, reinforcing legal change on the land, imposed new disciplinary practices on the landscape, partitioning it into private spaces off limits to individuals who once circulated relatively unimpeded across its contours (Blomley, 2007: 5). For small cultivators accustomed to using certain land on estates as a common resource, these legal and material practices, which restricted their freedom of movement, gave the landscape a new character while signaling the closure of the countryside (Neeson, 1993: 5).

The thesis of this article is that the efforts of English estate owners to remake the landscape into a series of private spaces, and
the efforts of Israeli Zionists to remake the Palestinian landscape into a series of Jewish spaces, are comparable exercises of power onto space. Such spatially-oriented projections of force, so central to Foucault’s notion of power, are examples of what is commonly described as territoriality. Territoriality is essentially a practice of power applied to land which changes the idea of “landscape” from a noun to a verb (Mitchell, 2002: 1). It refers to “human agency on the land” marked by “the effort of an individual or group to influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Mukerji, 1997: 2; Sack, 1986: 19).

The actions of English estate owners and Israeli Zionists are fundamentally territorial. In an effort to remake territory, these groups used power to establish different systems of sovereignty on the landscape, replacing existing systems of rules governing ownership, use rights, and patterns of circulation on the land with another. In effect, the power to make spaces on the landscape private, and the power to make spaces on the landscape Jewish, are comparable exercises in reconfiguring boundaries on the landscape and remaking lines on a map. Such exercises in remapping the landscape are part of a time-honored practice aimed at transforming the socio-economy, demography and culture of territorial space – the practice of enclosure.

**Argument: The Contours of Enclosure**

With comparison as a method and territoriality as a frame, this article builds an argument about enclosure as a modern practice of power used by groups with territorial ambitions. This practice consists of two basic instruments: a legal instrument that redefines rights to property by reorganizing systems of ownership, use, access, and socio-economic relations on the land; and a set of architectural instruments that reinforce the new legalities of property while recasting the landscape itself.

In remaking the landscape through enclosure, groups coveting territory use law and architecture to weaken the anchors holding subordinate groups to land. In England, the anchors securing subordinate groups to land consisted of the open-field agrarian village with its small-scale family farms, and the institution of common rights to land. In Palestine, the anchors securing Palestinians to land are the agrarian town, and the family farms connected to those towns.

By exploiting law and architecture, groups with territorial ambitions create an alternative set of institutional anchors that strengthen their dominant position on the landscape while
undermining the viability of those anchors securing subaltern groups to land. In England, the alternative anchor spearheading the process of domination by estate owners was the large-scale, profit-driven, “rent-maximizing farm” (Allen, 1992). In Palestine, the alternative anchor weakening Palestinian attachments to place while strengthening the landscape’s Jewish character is the Jewish settlement. As they proliferate across the landscape, the rent-maximizing farm and the Jewish settlement weaken the attachments of subordinate groups to land while driving a set of demographic changes that move populations as both precondition and outcome of enclosing the landscape.

What ignites the passions for enclosure is a shift in outlook in which those with territorial ambitions imagine ways to “improve” the landscape.

In England, this vision emerged from an evolving discourse about property rights culminating in the work of John Locke (1690) who argued that entitlement to land derived from ones’ labor to improve it. Locke inspired estate owners to reclaim control of land customarily given to collective uses by small-scale tenant farmers that Locke had scorned as land lying in waste, by emphasizing a unique capacity of estates for land improvement. What Locke suggested, and what estate owners put into practice, was the idea of rights to property through a proxy for improvement through one’s own labor – money. By Locke’s reasoning, estate owners were entitled to land through the wages they were able to pay someone else to work land and improve it (Seed, 2001: 16–17). In this way, estate owners could stake claims to land on the basis of the same improvement metaphor used by Locke to justify rights to property.

In Palestine, enclosure also emerged from the metaphor of improvement and rights to property in the vision popularized by Theodor Herzl (1896) to solve the problem of anti-Semitism against Jews. At the core of Herzl’s vision was not only a claim on Palestine as an outlet rightfully belonging to the Jewish people for escaping anti-Semitism. Herzl also insisted that European Jewry, with its experience of economic development, was uniquely positioned to improve what was represented as an undeveloped landscape. These beliefs inspired Zionists of the early 20th century and their present-day descendants to settle Palestine and improve it by altering its character from one in which Palestinians were its cultivators and stewards, to one in which patterns of settlement, cultivation, and control on the land became Jewish. Thus, while the idea of Palestine as “our land” is a story about a covenant from God, it is more fundamentally a secular narrative about rights of property motivated by the goal of staking a claim on territory through a promise of improving land, and “making the desert bloom.”
In this way, land improvement plays a pivotal role in an “imaginative geography,” a process initiated by groups with territorial ambitions who invent meanings about landscapes they covet, and frame discourses justifying why they are entitled to the landscapes being reinvented (Said, 2000). Crafted by Edward Said to describe the ideological impulses of groups seeking control of places and people, imagining geography is but a first step to seizing control of territorial landscapes and remaking them. Through the metaphor of improvement, groups with territorial ambitions frame alternative meanings about the land they seek by elevating their own credentials as improvers while denigrating those on the land as primitive, loathe to work and upgrade the land. In the process, groups seeking territory are able to justify why they are entitled to take possession of the imagined and reinvented land from those already there. By investing land with attributes of “primitiveness,” and “waste,” and by representing themselves as stewards of an improved landscape, groups with territorial ambitions project an imagined and invented vision of territory. Such imagined visions constitute “rhetorical technologies” that justify territorial dispossession and conquest on the basis of rational, legal arguments (Cheyfitz, 1997: xii).

In both England and Palestine, groups with territorial ambitions who imagine land differently find the route to their imagined visions constrained by an existing pattern of attachments, rights, and socio-economic relationships anchoring others to the soil. Enclosure provides a pathway through this constraint. What groups with territorial ambitions initially imagine as “my land” thus comes into their possession by using law and architecture to enclose the landscape.

Once imbued with a vision of land improvement, groups with power seek to impose a new structure of sovereignty over territory in order to implement this vision and transform patterns of ownership, use, and socio-economic relations on the land. Such exercises of power reshape territory by recasting the legal basis by which the less powerful own, use, exist on, and circulate across land. Altering these systems of ownership and access to land, in turn, involves a re-mapping of the space where people work, live and circulate. This practice reconfigures lines of inclusion and trespass thereby reshaping boundaries where those with less power can go, and what they can do on the land where they retain access. In some instances, re-mapping landscape and reshaping systems of access involves directly taking land from those living and working on it. In other instances, this practice annuls rights to access and use land in a certain way. Alongside this remapping are material transformations in which forms of architecture are deployed on the
landscape by those with power to reinforce, practically and communicatively, the legal impacts of enclosing land. In this way, legal change in property systems, in combination with physical infrastructure, alters the way people exist on, and circulate across land (Blomley, 2007). This re-mapping of space weakens the systems of attachment by which less powerful “subalterns” are anchored to territory.

In dislodging these anchors holding subalterns to land, enclosure employs similar mechanisms and exhibits similar impacts focusing on the notion of population transfer. Such movements of people, however, are typically conceived as forced migrations from one location to another. This study broadens this notion by conceiving of transfer not only as a change in the location of populations, but also a change in their social standing. Often, these processes, wrought by different gradients of power, are interdependent. Thus, when enclosing land, dominant groups move populations by resorting to measures such as outright expropriation, and at the same time induce transfer, manipulating the conditions of existence on the land through application of the law, thereby enabling populations to “choose” migration as a remedy. This process of moving populations spatially and socially to remake land is both a mechanism and final goal of enclosure. When in the wake of transfer, the anchors securing one group of people to land are weakened and a more powerful group assumes ownership and control of the land, enclosure is achieved and land assumes a new identity.

In England enclosure, by abrogating security of land tenure through elimination of common rights, transferred members of this group from agrarian activities on the land, into activities on the land connected to a new status as wage earners in both agriculture and rural industry. As enclosure expanded, many were driven from their rural origins altogether, emerging as wage workers in cities. In Palestine, enclosure also transferred Palestinians from agrarian activities into a new status as wage earners inside Israel by dispossessing them of land and property (Shafir and Peled, 2002: 112–125). At the same time, enclosure spirited Palestinians to different locations, many outside the boundaries of historic Palestine, where they assumed still another new status as refugees. In both cases, legal and physical changes grafted onto territory acted as catalysts for the process of transfer by altering rights of ownership and tenure on land, by changing how land could be used, and by restricting circulation across space.

By revealing these patterns of power on the landscape, this article also makes an argument about the relationship of enclosure to the two basic and often overlapping routes to modernity, the development of capitalism and the development of nationalism. Typically,
Enclosure in England is interpreted as pivotal in the transition to industrial society and is attached to the lineage of modernity associated with capitalist development (Allen, 1992). By contrast, Palestinian enclosure is typically assigned to the lineage of modernity marked by the territorial aspirations of cultural groups associated with nationalism (Yiftachel, 2002). By uncovering parallels in the two cases, this study emphasizes how the exercise of power and the recasting of place is fundamental in both routes to modernity, reinforcing the complementary character of capitalist development and state-building. This article addresses questions of what made territoriality integral to modernity, and how remaking landscape conformed to the aims of modern power holders from English landowners, to Israeli Zionists. What follows are the contours of these parallel worlds organized around two themes: the imaginings of the dominant groups that made them want to remake landscapes; and the instruments that enabled them to do it.

**Enclosure in England**

Enclosure witnessed a longstanding presence on the English landscape where it assumed two basic characteristics (Thirsk, 1967: 200–201). There were enclosures undertaken *piecemeal* akin to private agreements between cultivators, both copyhold tenants and freeholders alike, that did not lead to any real change in the operations of open field agriculture or common rights to land (Yelling, 1977: 6). Such enclosures involved the exchange of strips between farmers, or the amalgamation of land through purchase to overcome the disadvantages of scattered holdings and create larger, more efficient farms, the latter practice more accurately termed, *engrossing*. The second type of enclosure, however, was different often involving the use of force against tenants by landlords. At the core of this type of enclosure was the taking of land through eviction, or the taking of non-arable land on which tenants exercised rights of common use (Thirsk, 1967: 200–201; Allen, 1992: 25–29). These enclosures were often responsible for the eliminating small-scale agriculture anchored to family farms and creating those demographic impacts that would alter the landscape permanently. It is this second type of enclosure, first appearing in the mid-15th century as part of an effort by landlords to offset declining rental incomes in the aftermath of the Plague, that assumed the pivotal event in the development of agriculture in early modern England (Allen, 1992: 25). Parliamentary Enclosure, which emerged in the 18th century, was a continuation of those enclosures that eliminated common rights to land. By enabling landowners to register the enclosure of land by Act, Parliamentary enclosure essentially
added new powers of compulsion to the tools already in use by landowners for enclosing land and eliminating common rights on it (McCloskey, 1975: 125).

Geographically, Parliamentary enclosure was uneven. It was concentrated most heavily in the Midland Counties of England, the so-called arable belt where open field farming and common rights to land constituted the normal pattern of agriculture in contrast to the more pastoral regions of the north. It was also in the Midland Counties where open fields and common rights had survived earlier enclosure.

Parliamentary enclosure provided institutional support for an agrarian economy in which large farms absorbed small farms while the new owners leased the amalgamated holdings to tenants who cultivated the land with wage laborers (Allen, 1992: 1). This “landlord’s revolution” was part of a transformation already under way in which a system of open field cultivation, tied to rights for the common use of land gradually met its end (Allen, 1992; Neeson, 1993). In order to complete this metamorphosis, however, the system of rights anchoring commoners to the soil had to be replaced with new rules governing ownership of, access to, and control over land. Parliamentary enclosure provided this institutional platform aimed at redeeming land from one set of owners and users and transferring control of it to another (Turner, 1986).

On the landscape itself, what spearheaded this redistribution and helped bury the system of common rights was the “rent maximizing farm,” an enlarged, amalgamated landholding driven by the land hunger of large estates (Allen, 1992: 85–89). It was the rent maximizing farm, expanding into common land and spreading across the landscape, that weakened the anchors securing small tenant farmers to land. As bonds tying these small cultivators to land weakened, many drifted to the enclosed and amalgamated farms as wage earners, or to rural and urban industries (Neeson, 1993: 5–9). By the end of the 18th century only an estimated 10% of land remained in the hands of owner-occupied family farmers, a decline from an estimated 33% from the late 17th century marking a “revolutionary change” (Allen, 1992: 85). In this process, land assumed a new character, cultivated by wage labor. At the same time, the landscape itself assumed a different appearance as a series of bounded and enclosed spaces demarcated by walls, hedges and fences.

**Imagining Enclosure**

Parliamentary enclosure has roots in an evolving discourse about the economic and moral imperatives of improving land (Wade
Martins, 2004: 3–17; Tarlow, 2007: 42–50). Although land improvement had a lineage dating from the early 16th century (McCrae, 1992), the concept attained a new level of urgency by the opening years of the 18th century (Tarlow, 2007: 12–13). What had elevated improvement to this new status was its growing association with the national interest (Wade Martins, 2004: 7–17; Crawford, 2002: 12). In a period when England was assuming an increasingly imperial demeanor, improving land and increasing agrarian yields was not only a private matter, but a matter of national concern. At the same time, what was also changing the meaning of land improvement was a parallel discourse inspired by the Enlightenment linking improvement on the land to notions of progress and property rights. In this Enlightenment vision, ownership of landed property emerged as the highest stage of civilization and was thus the end point of progress (Tarlow, 2007: 19). In this way, land improvement converged with notions of progress, property rights, and the nation itself. As a practical matter, these ideas found expression in a program of enclosure. In the earlier period, enclosure had emerged as the practical remedy for improving land. In the new period, enclosure emerged once again as a way not only of improving land but of balancing the abstract aims of nationhood, property rights, and progress. With land improvement a national project, and with enclosure still considered the practical route for improving land, the way was open for those with aspirations to improve land to seek help through Parliamentary Act in accomplishing what was depicted as a public purpose.

Among those with a prominent role in promoting this new outlook was Locke. For him, humans in a “state of nature,” had access to property in common, but with the advent of agriculture, individuals were vested with rights to land based on their capacity to improve it through labor. By arguing that rights to property in land accrue to those willing to improve it, Locke and a following of agrarian experts convinced large English landholders of the urgency to legitimize their claims to plots of the earth through aggressive land improvement efforts. At the same time, by revealing private rights to property and collective uses of land to be incompatible, and by insisting that collective uses interfered with imperatives to improve, Locke and his followers created a different vision of who rightfully belongs on the land. “God gave the world to men in common,” he wrote, “but . . . it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common . . . He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, and labor was to be his title to it;” (Locke, 1690: 21). For Locke, appropriating land in order to improve it was effectively doing God’s work while protecting property was the rightful role of
government. In this way, property rights became part of the national interest.

Yet, not everyone willing to work was equally endowed as an owner of land. Locke qualified his labor-driven notion of ownership by introducing the idea of money as proxy for labor (Locke, 1690: 28–29). It was money that enabled the estate owner who did not work and who did not imbue land with the action of his body, to possess land. Money served as a means for the improvements that the landowner did not perform but paid others to do. In the end, the moneyed “labor” of estate owners created preferential rights to land over those actually working it (Seed, 2001: 16). These rights enabled the estates to recast land given to collective uses into land privately controlled based on the notion that they would put such land to work.

These philosophical sentiments of Locke on property assumed a practical orientation among 18th-century agrarian writers, notably Arthur Young, who emerged as arguably the most influential critic of open field farming and promoter of enclosure. For Young, enclosure was critical in achieving the productivity gains needed to improve agriculture. It did this by raising rents and creating larger farms. High rents, Young argued, encouraged the tenant farmer to be more productive while discouraging the proliferation of smaller farmers who Young insisted were impervious to improvement (Young, 1770: 47–48). Great farms “are the soul of the agricultural improvement,” Young wrote: “split them into [small] tenures,” and “you will find nothing but beggars and weeds” (Young, 1771: 67). Because of its critical role in promoting large, capital-intensive farming, enclosure for Young was “the first and greatest of all improvements” (Young, 1770: 104).

Nevertheless, enclosure had its critics who insisted that open fields and common rights were in fact the basis for the efficient techniques indispensable for feeding the nation (Neeson, 1993: 25). What these critics most feared, however, in defending open fields and common rights were the impacts of Parliamentary Enclosure in transforming the commoner into complete dependence on wages. For small cultivators, common rights entailed a degree of freedom from the wage system while dependence on the wage was the first step toward impoverishment, and ultimately migration and depopulation of villages. Opponents of Parliamentary enclosure aimed to avoid the expansion of a wage earning class and the disappearance of an agrarian economy tied to a system of relative wage independence (Neeson, 1993: 25).

Despite these appeals, purveyors of enclosure prevailed in the debate, but as enclosure gained momentum in two distinct waves during the Parliamentary period, one from 1760–1780, the next
from 1795–1815 (Turner, 1980: 67–68), the debate, far from ending, assumed a different tone. In the earlier stages of the debate, enclosure promoters insisted that enclosure had no adverse impacts. By 1760, however, enclosure advocates such as the Rev. John Howlett, a close friend of Young, conceded that enclosure indeed created a wage system and depopulated villages, but in the new period defended these outcomes as virtuous. Enclosure, they argued, would bring rural populations into manufacturing while creating a wage-dependent workforce for the large estates leading to greater agricultural yields, more stable grain prices, and greater levels of industrial output. In effect, the creation of a wage-dependent agricultural and manufacturing population, which previously supported arguments against enclosure, now justified the practice (Neeson, 1993: 27).

Such sentiments about the desirability of wage labor were consistent with ideas emerging in the late 18th century focusing on markets and the division of labor articulated by Adam Smith. For Smith, markets were the key to national wealth creation, while at the same time it was the division of labor that provided the source of growth in markets emphasizing how the two were mutually reinforcing (Smith, 1776: 13–36). Nevertheless, the division of labor was not restricted to activity internal to the factory. The division of labor was a social phenomenon both internal and external to the workshop (Perelman, 2000). The dilemma facing Smith and market advocates was how to recruit a class of wage earners for the specialized work in factories needed to promote the growth of markets. Such a project required measures restricting activities in the countryside that had provided commoners with incomes outside the wage system. These restrictions, in turn, would eventually compel commoners to work exclusively for wages.

Consequently, the creation of markets was a demographic project with territorial impacts. Embedded in the promotion of markets and the creation of a specialized laboring class was a process of transferring individuals into new activities, and relocating them in new places. Such a process, in both its social and spatial dimensions, would have profound ramifications on the land.

It was in this context – the desirability of creating a wage earning class – that a complementary argument emerged in favor of enclosure as sound public policy – that of “social discipline” (Thompson, 1963: 219). Indeed, the Board of Agriculture (a semi-public organization of large landowners founded in 1793 to promote a general enclosure act) argued that a wage-dependent workforce was a value to society (Neeson, 1993: 28). Dependent on wages, commoners would be forced into working on the enclosed farms, which, according to enclosure advocates, were often at a loss for labor. Enclosure,
insisted its promoters such as John Clark of Herefordshire, would compel commoners to take up “an honest employment, instead of losing time in idleness and waste” (from Snell, 1985: 170).

Similarly, supporters of Parliamentary enclosure argued how common land needed improvement because, absent property rights, it was primitive (Neeson, 1993: 30). Locke himself contributed to this view by characterizing Amerindian society as inferior because it lacked property rights (Locke, 1690: 24–28). Preserving common right was thus akin to leaving America to the Indians while eliminating this right was a pathway to redeeming land from its primitive and unimproved state. Arguably, it was John Sinclair, President of the Board of Agriculture, who likened the common economy most strongly to a primitive age, and who, inspired by the Napoleonic wars, insisted in 1803 on subduing it much like a foreign enemy. “Let us not be satisfied with the liberation of Egypt, or the subjugation of Malta,” writes Sinclair, “but let us subdue Finchley Common” while forcing those in its wake “to submit to the yoke of improvement” (quoted in Neeson, 1993: 31). In this way, land improvement became codified through metaphors of colonization, civilization, and conquest. What began as a vision to improve agrarian productivity evolved into an ideology promoting the redemption of land from those who would keep it primitive, unenclosed, and thus unimproved.

**Instruments of Enclosure**

Once landholders became convinced that eliminating common rights provided opportunities to secure greater returns from land, they developed mechanisms for enclosing land that consisted of two basic instruments (Whyte, 2003: 9). The first was legal. Parliamentary enclosure removed communal rights for peasant commoners attached to an area of land, usually within a village or parish, and replaced these rights by substituting a new structure of ownership on that land, usually by a single owner. Such an instrument, in recasting rights of property, expressed a relation of power through a legal discourse about rights of access and trespass on the landscape. The second instrument was architectural. It entailed the demarcation of the enclosed land with a wall, hedgerow, or fence. Such architectural emplacements also expressed a relation of power in terms of rights of access and trespass on the landscape, but in this case, power emerged not only communicatively, but materially as well. Similar to the legal instrument, walls, hedgerows, and fences also created closed areas that pre-empted circulation across the landscape (Blomley, 2007). Together, the legal removal of rights to use land as a common resource, and the
material impediment to freedom of movement were mutually reinforcing in reconstituting the routes of access and the boundaries of trespass on the landscape. Through law and landscape architecture estate owners created the enlarged privatized spaces of the great farms – the rent-maximizing farms – and in the process established a landscape with very different socio-economic practices, a different demography, and a different identity.

By reconfiguring routes of access and spaces of trespass on the landscape, these two enclosure instruments of law and architecture undermined the system of common rights and the social structure of the open-field village by which commoners were attached to landscape and place. Common rights were of two types. There were those designated legally and registered in local manorial courts. There were also common rights exploited through sufferance (custom). Whether legally or by sufferance, the right to exploit resources from land held by members of a parish or village in common acted as an income supplement for smaller cultivators. This supplement is what enabled many to secure a livelihood just beyond the Malthusian threshold. Furthermore, what common rights provided to small cultivators was a material barrier separating many in this group from a life completely dependent on work for wages.²

For the small farmer, the most important source of income deriving from the commons came from grazing. The ability to graze stock on common land, or on the wastes of harvested crops on open fields, and exploit the products from cowkeeping – milk, butter, and cheese – either through consumption or from sale, had an income value. In this sense, the laborer’s cow, stocked from common pasture, was worth as much as wage work (Humphries, 1990: 24).

Other rights of the commons were also important supplements to income. There were rights of turbary for obtaining fuel, and estover rights to cut wood. There were rights of hunting on common land for wild birds and small game such as rabbits. There were rights of foraging for berries, fruits, and nuts and other useful materials on common land for making items such as brooms. Whatever could be scavenged rather than purchased was exploited. In this sense, common rights enabling the earning of incomes depended on a landscape of open access. In establishing rules of trespass where commoners pursued these rights, and reinforcing these rules with physical barriers, enclosure weakened a form of economic organization tied specifically to the landscape. Made more dependent on wage work, commoners emerged with a different status in new locations, reflected in changes in the landscape itself.

In playing a pivotal role as a solvent for agriculture tied to common rights, the rent-maximizing farm launched a series of
far-reaching socio-economic and demographic changes on the landscape. Driven by the efforts of estates to secure new sources of revenue, these farms increased income for estate owners in two ways: by expanding the amount of land in cultivation or pasture; and by thinning out the number of agricultural workers arrayed upon the enlarged footprint of cultivation or pasture. Rental increases accrued to estates from the expansion of total land under their control (with less land held in common), and from the way these farms could be subdivided into larger tenancies supplanting the small open-field family farm. This twofold process – colonizing formerly common land and bringing it into cultivation or pasture under the ownership of the estates, and expanding the size of tenancies on these larger pieces of land – is what enabled the enclosure process to diminish the numbers working the land and act as a catalyst for socio-economic and demographic change on the landscape.

After landholders became convinced that common rights and open fields were an impediment to generating more income from land, their decision to enclose was driven by perceptions about the costs, and the expected returns from enclosure (Turner, 1984: 36–83). For any Parliamentary enclosure, the costs on landholders consisted of two main categories (Whyte, 2006: 97; Allen, 1992: 163–167). There were public costs born by all members of a parish or village being enclosed. Such costs consisted of: legal fees for drafting and putting a bill before Parliament; the hiring of commissioners and their clerks to administer the enclosure; fees paid to surveyors and in some cases mapmakers; the cost of fencing the allotment given to the tithe owner of the parish; and the cost of physical improvements such as new roads, drainage of hollows. There were also personal costs born by the individual landowner consisting primarily of demarcating the newly redrawn boundaries of the individual allotment through construction of fencing, hedges, or walls and the construction of drainage ditches. The public costs generally amounted to roughly 33% of the total while remaining two-thirds of enclosure costs for the landowners consisted of the personal physical improvement costs (Clark, 1998: 100). Many smaller landowners given allotments of land through enclosure awards did not have sufficient income to pay for enclosure and therefore ended up selling their allotment to larger landowners. On these newly-consolidated large-scale farms, rental increases expected from tenants are what enabled landowners to offset these costs.

The logic of using enclosure to secure higher rents, in turn, depended on raising productivity on the land, but the source of the productivity advance from enclosure did not stem not from higher
yields per acre, but from more land in cultivation or pasture and fewer workers tending the enlarged holdings. As Ricardo noted in his theory of rent, agricultural improvements capable of generating higher rents are of two types: those that increase yields on the land, and those that enable society to obtain the same yields with less labor (Ricardo: 1817: 42). The increases in rental income captured by large estate farms stemmed from the second type, that is, improvements in labor productivity. Enhancements in labor productivity enabled the land to produce greater levels of output with fewer workers.

Estates enlarged by enclosure exploited this productivity advantage and captured more income by recasting tenancies on the land, creating the 200-acre tenancies that supplanted the 50-acre open field family farm (Allen, 1992: 86, 211–215). With fewer families on the landscape requiring a minimum level of subsistence, and with land generating greater aggregate levels of output with fewer hands, estates from 1750–1790 were able to redirect productivity gains back to themselves with large estate owners able to increase rents by at least 40–50 percent, and in most cases much higher (Mingay, 1994: 48). The expectation of rent increases from larger land holdings, in turn, gave estate owners incentives to acquire even more land through enclosure. While estates had initiated large-scale land acquisitions prior to mid-century in order to create bigger, labor-saving income-enhancing farms – such farms had already enabled English agrarian productivity to surpass France by 1750 – Parliamentary enclosure accelerated these productivity gains (Allen, 1992: 212–217). In using far less labor per acre of land, these farms created pressures for the social and spatial movement of populations.

Because Parliamentary enclosure encouraged the creation of larger, less labor-intensive farms, it reinforced demographic changes differentiating England from Europe. Beginning in 1750, as population growth in England began to outpace Europe, decisive shifts were occurring in patterns of urban and rural growth. From 1700–1800, urban dwellers in England increased threefold to 24% of total inhabitants, while in Northwest Europe, the region geographically and economically most proximate to England, urbanization accounted for only 10% of the population in 1800 (Wrigley, 1989: 177).

Even more striking were the changes in the rural population. Although rural inhabitants increased dramatically from 1750–1801, what is most revealing is the decline of the rural population working in agriculture, and the increase in the rural nonagricultural population, so that by 1801 rural agricultural and nonagricultural populations are identical (Table 1). It is this trend – the
growth in rural inhabitants working outside agriculture – that distinquished English demography (Wrigley, 1989: 190).

These demographic trends reveal a population transferred in two related ways. One type of transfer was social. By eroding, and in some cases eliminating the sources of subsistence deriving from access to common land, enclosure cast certain rural inhabitants into a status of total dependency on wage work in both agriculture and rural industry. The other type of transfer was territorial. It involved the migration of rural inhabitants into cities.

Ironically, it was Young who in his later writings offered some of the most explicit evidence of the land losses by smallholders, admitting how a typical enclosure commissioner “had been an accessory to injuring at least 2,000 poor people” (Young, 1801: 137). The smallholder, he argued “may as well have nothing allotted to him” because the large owner, with first choice on enclosure allotments, “renders the holding of the small farmer untenable.” In this way, the small owner was forced into selling his property to his larger adjoining neighbor which according to Young, was the cause of rural depopulation” (Young, 1813: 117).3

This phenomenon of smallholders compelled to sell what in the absence of common rights became economically unviable, is part of a broader demographic process of transfer. As late as 1688, at least 33% of the land was still owned by small holders. By 1801, this figure had dropped to 10% (Allen, 1992: 85). Whether by force or by “choice,” small farmers were leaving their farms in open field villages in the wake of the advance of the great farms promoted earlier by Young, assuming different identities in new places. At the same time, the legal and architectural instruments of Parliamentary enclosure promoting these demographic changes became imprinted materially onto the landscape itself.

Before the widespread enclosure of landscape, the spatial form for open field villages had two basic attributes (Barrell, 1972: 103–104; Whyte, 2003: 7). They were circular deriving from the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Inhabitants (millions)</th>
<th>Urban Inhabitants (millions)</th>
<th>Urban Inhabitants %</th>
<th>Rural Ag Inhabitants (millions)</th>
<th>Rural Non-Ag Inhabitants (millions)</th>
<th>Rural Non-Ag Inhabitants as % of Rural Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

strips of farmland arranged in rings around the built up area of the village; and open without barriers to impede circulation with roads, tracks and footpaths of an irregular design, connecting the homesteads in the village to the fields, meadows, and commons. By the end of the first large wave of Parliamentary enclosure in 1770, this landscape emerged with a more linear grid of large square or rectangular landholdings. Complementing this change were wider, straighter access roads and a new pattern of walls, hedges, and fences proliferating across the landscape (Whyte, 2003: 63). By the end of the 18th century Parliamentary enclosure had created the greatest single change in the land within the shortest comparable time span, producing what was described as a “Georgian” landscape characterized by a more sharply demarcated set of bounded and private spaces, with closed rights of way stemming from the roughly 200,000 miles of newly-erected walls, hedges, and fencing (Turner, 1980: 16; Rackham, 1986: 190–191). It was a revolution in the spatial organization of the agrarian landscape reflecting a socio-economic and demographic transformation (Whyte, 2003: 4; Neeson, 1993: 5). Communicated in this landscape were very different concepts of ownership and control over land along with a new social order and source of power in the countryside.

At the core of this reorganization of landscape was an institutional change, spawned from an imagined vision of improving land, that created larger farms enclosed by walls, hedges and fences, fewer workers, and a demographic process whereby those on the land moved into greater dependence on wage work, and new locations for work and living. The privatized spaces grafted upon the land from law and landscape architecture succeeded in redirecting the spatial circulation pattern of peasant bodies while disciplining them to behave in new ways (Blomley, 2007: 4). Many who owned land either lost it, or sold it becoming rural and urban wage earners with a different relationship to the soil, while tenants lost leases and also became “free.” In the end, the landscape assumed a new character in supporting a different agrarian economy. What was once open had become bounded. Where there was free access, there was now closure. What was initially “imagined,” had become part of the landscape.

Enclosure in Palestine

While enclosure in England is a story about privatizing land once common, enclosure in Palestine is a story about “Judaizing” land formerly Arab (Yiftachel, 2006). Spawned from the nationalist impulses of Zionist ideology, this project of redeeming the land-
scape and making it Jewish has resulted in the unmaking of Palestine as Palestinian (Falah, 2003). The historical geography of the Palestinian landscape attests to the thoroughness of this effort. In 1945, Jewish public agencies and private investors owned roughly 14.5% of the cultivatable and urban built-up area land in Palestine, while Palestinian Arabs owned roughly 68% with the remaining 18% classifiable as public land consisting primarily of grazing areas attached to villages or the public grazing areas of the Beduin in the Beersheba District (Hadawi, 1970: 19–28). Today, these allocations are almost exactly reversed (Usher, 2005: 27).

At the same time, this process of land redemption was not driven exclusively by issues of ethno-religious identity. Redeeming Palestine was also a project of economic modernization undertaken by Zionists in the spirit of improving land (Yiftachel, 2006). In this way, Judaization and modernization emerged as mutually reinforcing elements of the same project to remake the Palestinian landscape.

This redemption and remaking of land in Palestine has unfolded in two phases. The initial phase has its origins in the late 19th century when Zionist leaders, in an effort to confront the problem of anti-Semitism, advocated the creation of a “haven” in Palestine for Jews (Khalidi, 2005). The second phase began with the realization of this aim following the establishment of Israel in 1947–48. This phase itself can be divided into two periods, one from 1947–67 in which the Zionist movement remade 78% of Palestine into a Jewish territory, the other from 1967-present day in which the Zionist project is poised to redeem the remaining portion. Although Palestinian territory is now divided into the state of Israel and territory occupied by this state, the process of enclosing and redeeming land is common to both areas and reveals similar features. This shared experience emphasizes how both areas are part of the same geo-political unit shaped by the same imagined vision of the land (Benvenisti, 1995; Yiftachel, 2006: 8).

**Imagining Enclosure**

An imagined geography provided inspiration for the enclosure of landscape in Palestine. This imagined vision, in turn, has its origins in 19th century nationalism which motivated segments of European Jewry to seek a homeland for the Jewish people. Such sentiment was part of a broader outlook affirming the legitimacy of culturally differentiated groups having equal rights to self-determination and statehood. As a legitimate cultural group, Jews insisted upon their right, alongside the rights of other cultural groups, to a territorial
“container” within the discrete territorial spaces of the modern state system (Taylor, 1994).

In the prelude to this imagined vision of statehood, European Jews had advocated a “return to Zion” in the late 19th century to combat the anti-Semitism of the time, complementing this aspiration with an embrace of state-building as the route to liberation from anti-Jewish prejudice. At the same time, Jews found inspiration for returning to from their own interpretations of Scripture; from God’s supposed covenant with Abraham to cede Palestine to the Jewish people. What emerged from this fusion of a return of the Jewish people to build a state in their historic homeland was a predominantly secular and nationalist ideology to overcome anti-Semitic persecution, but one imbued with certain religious overtones (Zerubavel, 1995: 13–22). By the 1880s, Zionists had framed a potent set of arguments, culled from their own culturally-based historical narrative as well as nationalist ideology, for imagining Palestine as Hebrew Land and staking a claim on it as the property of the Jewish people.

The transition of this early Zionist imagined geography of Palestine into a more widespread set of beliefs dates from the work of Theodor Herzl (1896) and his visionary text of a state homeland for the Jewish people. Insisting that anti-Semitism was intractable, Herzl argued that only a Jewish state would enable Jews to escape the scourge of anti-Semitic prejudice. Nevertheless, in a departure from his Zionist predecessors, Herzl argued his case and made his appeal for creation of a Jewish state almost entirely in a discourse of development, modernization, and improvement. As part of his effort to justify Palestine for the territorial container to overcome anti-Semitism, Herzl characterized the Palestinian landscape as primitive, absent cultivation and akin to waste (Shlaim, 2001: 5; Masalha, 2001: 37–38). For Herzl, European Jewry, with its industrious character and development experience contrasted with the supposedly barren landscape. In addition, with the exception of one brief reference in the book’s second chapter, the author of The Jewish State makes no mention of Palestine’s existing inhabitants despite the fact that he was well aware of the area’s Arab population (Herzl, 1896; Shlaim, 2001: 4). According to Herzl and others in the Zionist leadership following the First Zionist Congress of 1897, remaking Palestine as a state for Jews could be accomplished by convincing Palestinian Arabs that a prosperous Jewish state would be in their interest. Indeed, it was through the metaphor of improvement that Herzl envisioned overcoming the seemingly intractable problem of building a Jewish state in a territory overwhelmingly Arab. For Herzl, the depressed landscape, and the commitment he envisioned of Jewish settlers to improve it –
alongside the moral legitimacy of Jewish statehood – conferred upon Zionists a right to the land of Palestine.

Despite the efforts of Herzl and other Zionists to rationalize the demographic dilemma within the discourse of development and improvement, the fate of the area’s Arab population remained a problem largely unresolved. Although in his own Diaries (1895), Herzl himself had made a fleeting reference to “spiriting away” the Arabs, Zionists tended to underplay the difficulties of creating a Jewish state in a place with an overwhelming majority of non-Jewish inhabitants. Despite the prophetic warnings of Ze’ev Jabotinsky who insisted that Palestinians could not be transferred from the territory and who argued that a Jewish state in Palestine would involve the use of force that he metaphorically termed, an Iron Wall (1923), Zionists in the pre-state period remained largely undeterred in believing in their mission of redeeming the land of Palestine and held fast to an imagined vision of Palestine as a Jewish state.

If Jabotinsky was one to accept force but reject transfer as the solution to the Zionist dilemma, it was David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973) who eventually synthesized both ideas into a program for Jewish statehood in Palestine. Like other Zionists at least partly inspired by socialism, Ben-Gurion was reluctant to promote force, at least openly, to achieve statehood. After Palestinians resisted colonization during events known as the Arab Revolt of 1936–39, however, he came to accept Jabotinsky’s view that military power, not negotiation, was necessary to accomplish Zionist aims (Shlaim, 2001: 17). At the same time, the Revolt compelled Ben-Gurion to diverge from Jabotinsky’s view that military power, not negotiation, was necessary to accomplish Zionist aims (Shlaim, 2001: 17). At the same time, the Revolt compelled Ben-Gurion to diverge from Jabotinsky and embrace transfer as the logic of force. By 1937–38, Ben-Gurion insisted that transfer had always been the aim of Zionist colonization. “I support compulsory transfer,” he would say. “I don’t see in it anything immoral” (quoted in Morris, 2001: 44). This synthesis of Ben-Gurion emphasizing both force and transfer would prevail as the dominant perspective within Zionism for the path to Jewish statehood, contributing to an imagined geography of Palestine absent Palestinians.4

As early as 1936, however, Zionists were already remaking Palestinian territory in accordance with these principles in a settlement program known as the Homa Umigdal. Although seemingly defensive, these settlements were an offensive system of land development elaborated by the land purchasing arm of the Zionist movement, the Jewish National Fund whose aim was to seize control of land in remote parts of the country. The program consisted of a “conquering troop” to populate purchased land; walls to preclude encroachment; and a tower to police the surroundings for what was considered hostile opposition (Rotbard, 2003: 42). From 1936–47 roughly 118 of these outposts were built not only to take
control of land inside these communities. They sought to make the area surrounding the settlements *de facto* Jewish by rendering it dangerous for the local population to access their own land adjacent to these enclaves thereby effectively colonizing territory and redeeming land from Palestinians. The symbolic role of these settlements, however, was also paramount. Essentially the *Homa Umigdal*, with their walls and towers, translated an imagined geography of statehood into a landscape of built forms for redeeming land that became prescient signals for the future landscape of the Zionist project. Perhaps more importantly, this project revealed how the Zionist movement would use law and the built environment as instruments to enclose land and redistribute rights of ownership, use and access on the landscape in the years to come when an historic opportunity presented itself and Israel emerged as a state.

**Instruments of Enclosure**

Since the founding of Israel in 1948, law and the built environment have provided the catalyst for the redemption of territory, both inside the new state and later in Occupied Palestine, by spawning the institution most responsible for the de-Arabization of landscape, the *Jewish settlement*. Much like the rent-maximizing farms of Parliamentary Enclosure in England, the Jewish settlement has spearheaded a series of socio-economic and demographic measures that have weakened the anchors securing Palestinians to the land while driving anchors into the land securing a different group of people to the landscape. What has emerged is a landscape redefined in character. Where Palestinians Arabs were once the owners and stewards on the land is now a landscape with Jewish land ownership and stewardship.

Redemption of landscape through settlement began with the passage of laws that elevated the status of Jews in the newly-emergent state while circumscribing rights of citizenship accorded to Arabs inside Israel with a legally differentiated status as non-Jewish. Codified in this legal framework were institutions empowered to allocate land based on religious identity. In practical terms, the law facilitated the transfer of land and property from Arab to Jewish ownership thereby establishing the foundations for redeeming the landscape through Jewish settlement (Forman and Kedar, 2004). The proliferation of settlements, in turn, has not only reallocated property and created a series of new Jewish spaces. Settlements have recast routes of access and trespass on the landscape such that the Israeli geography has been reshaped.
by an ever-expanding grid of Jewish spaces, effectively off limits to Palestinians.

These processes of confiscating and reallocating land and reconfiguring routes of access and trespass on land have weakened the two institutions of Palestinian society that anchor Palestinians to the landscape. One such institution is Palestinian agricultural town. The other is the Palestinian family farm.

The Palestinian Town and Farm in Israel

From the outset of state formation, the Jewish community in Israel used law and the built environment to undermine the viability, as well as erase the memory of the Palestinian town as part of the settlement project. Within Israel, this project of targeting the Palestinian town assumed two forms. One consisted of legally taking the land belonging to residents of the roughly 600 Arab villages and towns abandoned during formation of the Israeli state in 1947–49 when Palestinians from these places took flight or were expelled by Zionist armed forces (Sitta, 2000). Such expropriations constituted 66% of the land seized from Palestinians inside Israel (Shafrir and Peled, 2002: 113). Upon expropriation, this land was insulated from claims by its former Palestinian owners by the Law of Absentee Property (1950), recast into a new status as Israeli state land by the Law of State Property (1951), and as a final step to transforming the landscape, re-allocated for construction of new Jewish settlements by the Law of Development (1953). As part of this process of expropriation and reallocation, innumerable homes of Palestinians from these towns were demolished as hundreds of former Palestinian villages were razed, the land graded and readied for construction of new Jewish towns. In this way, law and construction framed a new Israeli cartography of Palestinian towns erased, and replaced with roughly 700 Jewish settlements.6

This urban reconstruction had profound demographic consequences. Roughly 80% of the Arab population transferred in 1947–48 from the 600 villages to different locations through force or “choice,” assumed a new and more permanent status in these locations as refugees when laws prohibiting the return to their homes and property were passed in the wake of statehood (Forman and Kedar, 2004). Originally numbering an estimated 750,000, these Palestinian refugees transferred from villages within what became Israel, and their present-day descendants now total roughly 4.25 million most of whom are dispersed throughout the region along with some in more remote locations such as the U.S. In this way, the instruments of law and construction that supplemented overt violence in obliterating the Palestinian town resulted
in the large-scale transfer of Palestinians and their replacement by Jewish residents, altering the attributes and identity of the landscape.

The other form of targeting the Palestinian town inside Israel through the legal and architectural mechanisms of Jewish settlement corresponds to land taken from those Arab municipalities within the boundaries of the new Israeli state that survived the conflict of 1947–49. Similar to the measures used on emptied villages, land belonging to the surviving Israeli Arab towns was expropriated, converted to state property, and reallocated for construction of new Jewish towns, destroying the fabric of Palestinian urbanization in Israel (Benvenisti, 2000: 7). Owing to this policy of land confiscation and settlement, Palestinian towns in Israel have lost their historically developed role as nodes in rural-urban and inter-urban networks for production, trade, and communications – the “urban systems” – that sustain economic and social life. These linkages formed the interurban and rural-urban trade networks where the products of both agriculture and urban handicraft circulated for sale in both agrarian villages and larger urban cities (Doumani, 1995: 54–57). Replacing this Palestinian urban system is a landscape of Jewish settlements creating its own pattern of interurban and rural-urban trade while spawning an urban-based industrial structure linked to the advanced industrial economies.

In addition, Israeli planning and building law has undermined the Arab town in Israel by making it difficult, if not impossible for the towns’ individual residents to obtain permits from local district planning councils to expand their homes or build anew. Consequently, Arabs in Israel are invariably forced to build illegally. If Israeli authorities discover such construction, however, they can – and at times do – demolish the house or building. Such practices, even when they do not lead to demolishing a building, deter Palestinians from building due to fear of demolition (Yiftachel, 1996). These planning laws, along with the practice and threats of demolition, prevent Palestinian towns from expanding beyond existing boundaries. The result is a series of towns effectively enclosed.

Disconnected from other Palestinian towns, disenfranchised from the grid of connections to Jewish towns, and immobilized within constrained boundaries unable to expand, Palestinian towns in Israel towns are enclosed behind a series of legal and architectural barriers and form an unconnected matrix of isolated urban “reservations” on the landscape.

The pattern of settlement, that has undermined the Palestinian town inside Israel, has at the same time shattered the system of agriculture central to these agrarian communities while destroying and ultimately erasing the second anchor in the Palestinian system
of belonging, the village-based family farm. In its place emerged the Jewish kibbutz and moshav, and as these agrarian institutions faltered, large industrial farms which now dominate the agrarian landscape inside Israel. As a result, Palestinians in Israel, cut off from access to their farms, are now dependent on wage work, mostly inside the Jewish settlements and in their agricultural surroundings, a process of social transfer described as “the proletarianization of agrarian communities” (Shafir and Peled, 2002: 112–125).

Consequently, where the landscape once supported a pattern of Palestinian farms attached to Palestinian agrarian villages, the landscape now supports a pattern of Jewish farms attached to Jewish settlements. Where Palestinians once worked their own farms, they now earn a living as wage earners on Jewish farms. Where Palestinians once built their own homes and towns, they now labor as construction workers building Jewish settlements. What these processes reveal is a system of law and building applied to the landscape that has transferred land and property from one group to another. At the same time this system has transferred human subjects, keeping Palestinians outside of Israel as refugees, while transforming the social status of those Palestinians in Israel who have remained into a pool cheap labor for the landscape’s new owners and stewards.

Town, Farm, and the Matrix of Control in Occupied Palestine

In Occupied Palestine, the state of Israel uses essentially the same instruments of law and the built environment to settle and enclose the landscape. Much like in Israel, law and the built environment weaken the same institutional anchors that secure Palestinians to land, the agrarian town and the family farm. As a result, both areas – Israel and the Occupied Territories – reveal a similar pattern of an ever-shrinking set of spaces where Palestinians live and circulate, and an ever-expanding landscape of Jewish spaces effectively off limits to Palestinians. What is different in the Occupied Territories, however, is the more widespread reliance on overt forms of violence as a supplement to the instruments of law and the built environment for creating this landscape of diminishing grids of ownership, use, and circulation for Palestinians, and widening spaces of ownership, use and circulation for Israeli Jews. This use of force for settlement and enclosure is evident in the establishment of what has been termed, a matrix of control grafted onto the Palestinian landscape in which law, the built environment and organized violence are all part of the same territorial project (Halper, 2002).

At the core of this matrix is an elaborate legal framework for confiscating land from Palestinians, reclassifying it as Israeli “state
land,” and reallocating it for Israeli settlement. Differing from the laws passed in Israel during the 1950s to accomplish similar aims, this process utilizes three basic mechanisms. First, in an effort to imbue the process of land confiscation and reallocation with a legal charter, the Israeli Occupation Administration has made use of an older framework for land ownership in Palestine, the Ottoman Land Law of 1858. This law enabled Ottoman rulers in Palestine to take control of land considered uncultivated (miri) or unused (mawat), reclassify it as state land, and reallocate it to promote cultivation or activity that could then be taxed. This use of legal precedent for seizing land reveals the second mechanism – the requirement on Palestinians to produce title to their land. The problem is that much of the land owned and farmed historically by Palestinians is without documentation. Under British and Jordanian rule, a process of land registration was initiated to enable Palestinians to acquire title to their land but the program remained substantially incomplete. By 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank, it halted these registrations. Absent title, Palestinian land, in the interpretation of the Israeli Occupation Administration, is classifiable as state land – miri or mawat – since there is technically no owner. In this way, Palestinian land is perched at all times on the precipice of legal confiscation.7

If, however, the state of Israel has utilized an elaborate legal framework to avoid appearances of seizing private Palestinian land, it has nevertheless resorted to extra-legal measures – force – when legality has been insufficient for seizing land and property. Roughly 40% of the land currently occupied by Israeli settlements in the West Bank is private Palestinian property that, even according to Israeli law, has been seized and transferred illegally.8 In effect, a legal framework for confiscating and reallocating land – backed by the use of force when this legality has been compromised – is the basis on which the architectural elements comprising the matrix of control have been arrayed upon the Palestinian landscape.

As a series of built forms, the matrix of control has as its central element the roughly 175 Jewish settlements built on Palestinian territory. Occupying innumerable West Bank hilltops, Israeli settlements in Occupied Palestine have fragmented Palestinian territory into a landscape of impassible zones more profoundly than any other element. Where settlements are built, zones of trespass emerge on the landscape for Palestinians since the latter are not allowed in or near settlements.9

The second element of the matrix consists of the system of roads built for these settlements, linking them together and connecting them to towns in Israel. Like settlements, the road network is also built on land confiscated from Palestinians and thus trans-
forms additional areas of the landscape into spaces off limits to Palestinians who are not allowed to travel on most segments of these “settler roads.” Furthermore, Palestinians are forbidden from approaching areas within close proximity to these roadways. In this way, territorial spaces for roads where Palestinians once circulated – and in many instances once owned – are, like settlements, transformed into Jewish spaces while assuming the character of inaccessible zones of trespass for Palestinians.

As settlements in Occupied Palestine increase in number and expand in size (Table 2), so too does the effort by the Israeli Occupation Authorities to control the circulation of Palestinians in, near, and between these areas. As a result, the entire landscape in the West Bank has been transformed into areas of regimentation and control. From these efforts to control circulation across the landscape emerges the third primary element in the control matrix, the checkpoint. The checkpoint is primarily a corridor linking adjacent areas on the landscape through which Palestinians must pass in moving from one area to another. In these corridors, Palestinians encounter friction, mostly in the form of long waits imposed by authorities administering these checkpoints before passage to an adjacent area is possible. Where Palestinians encounter this friction, they form “camps” on the landscape, clusters of human beings immobilized and impeded from moving by the exercise of power enforced upon space. With hundreds of checkpoints inside Occupied Palestine, at any one time there are hundreds of these camps distributed across the Palestinian landscape.

The fragmented geography of impassible zones emerging from this matrix of control is now being reinforced most dramatically by a fourth element, referred to by the Government of Israel as the “Security Fence” and by Palestinians as The Wall. Built by the

<p>| Table 2: Israeli Settlement Population / Land Confiscation in Occupied Palestine |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>E. Jerusalem</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Cumulative % of Total Land Confiscated (West Bank / Gaza = 5,950,000 Dunums)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>8400</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4,323</td>
<td>33,300</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>38,323</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>55,690</td>
<td>103,900</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>161,740</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>95,165</td>
<td>137,400</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>236,465</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>180,335</td>
<td>170,400</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>357,335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>282,000</td>
<td>186,857*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>468,857</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*figure for 2006
**estimates based on ratio of total settlers to total land
state of Israel ostensibly for security purposes, the route of the barrier also suggests a different set of motivations. First, roughly 87% of the now 723 kilometer-long structure lies on land inside the boundaries of Occupied Palestine (United Nations, 2008). Situated within the West Bank, the barrier has created in its most profound impact by separating one Palestinian community from another while also separating numerous farmers from their farmland. Second, the barrier reaches inside Occupied Palestine at the sites of several key Israeli settlement blocs, Modi'in Illit, Ariel, and Gush Etzion, winding around the Eastern peripheries of these settlements effectively annexing Palestinian land in the vicinity of these sites. The overall effect of the Wall is thus additional land confiscation, additional land transferred from Palestinian to Jewish ownership and control, and more impassible spaces on the landscape for Palestinians.

Through its legal mechanisms and built forms – supplemented by force – the matrix of control has compromised the Palestinian town through the practices of land confiscation, house demolitions, and urban fragmentation. Similar to Palestinian towns inside Israel, Palestinian towns in the Occupied Territories possess small fractions of their former land inventory having been dispossessed of their surrounding agricultural land. Typical is the case of Husan near Bethlehem. “We used to have 7800 dunums of land,” says Ali Mustafa Shoshe, Manager of the Husan Village Council. “From 1982–86 Israeli authorities confiscated 5200 dunums of land belonging to our farmers to build the settlement of Bettar Illit. After the settlement was built, we were left with only 2400 dunums” (Interview, 7/24/06).

In addition, the town in Occupied Palestine is the site of numerous demolitions of homes and property similar to, but far more widespread than in the Palestinian town inside Israel. From 1967-present, roughly 18,000 Palestinian houses have been demolished in the Occupied Territories. At any one time there are over 2000 standing demolition orders for Palestinian houses. In this way, demolition of homes and property in the Occupied Territories represents continuity with what has occurred inside Israel since 1948 (Halper, 2006: 28–29).

If the Palestinian town has contracted due to land confiscations and is prevented from expanding by property demolitions similar to the Palestinian town inside Israel, so too does the town in Occupied Palestine exhibit similar attributes of isolation characteristic of Palestinian towns in Israel. What has emerged in Occupied Palestine owing to the construction of settlements, roads, checkpoints, and the Barrier, is a landscape of fragmented urban enclaves corresponding to the areas in and around the cities of
Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Tulkarem, Jericho, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, South Hebron, and the Jordan Valley (UNOCHA, 2006). With vast expanses of the landscape closed, with much of their agricultural lands taken, and with their connections to other towns dramatically curtailed, these enclaves function much like the isolated Palestinian towns inside Israel as economic dead zones.

One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon is the enclave of Bethlehem and its once vibrant central commercial area along the Jerusalem-Hebron Road at the Western entrance to the town. This area is now bounded by a large checkpoint terminal and surrounded by the Wall, with many of its shops and restaurants now closed or barely in business. Nearby, Isam Albandek, the owner of Albandek Marble and Stone, one of the oldest stone cutting businesses in Palestine, describes how the Wall forty meters from his facility, is destroying his neighborhood and with it, his livelihood. “We used to have 65 employees,” he says. “Now we have ten. Because of the Wall, it is completely dead here. There is no traffic, no people, no transport, no business” (Interview 7/31/05).

While the Palestinian town has been compromised by land confiscations and territorial fragmentation associated with the matrix of control, the Palestinian farm has experienced a similar fate. Just as in Israel, it is farmland where most of the property used for Jewish settlement is confiscated. Typical is the experience of Mahmoud Sabatin of Husan after the settlement of Bettar Illit was built nearby. “In 1985, my family lost 40 dunums of land,” he explains. “Now houses from Bettar Illit sit on land that was ours.” Such reallocation of land, however, is not limited to initial settlement construction. The expansion of existing settlements – from large settlement blocs such as Modi'in Illit expanding onto land owned by farmers from Bil'in, Nah'lin and Deir Qaddis, to smaller settlements such as Zufim expanding onto land owned by farmers from Jayyous – is also part of a process in Occupied Palestine of land passing from one type of ownership into another.

In addition to settlements redeeming land from Palestinian farmers, elements of the built environment, most notably the Barrier built by Israel, are promoting similar impacts since most of this architectural infrastructure is being built on Palestinian farmland. In some instances, it is the direct impacts of construction that are destroying the Palestinian farm as happened to Fayez and Mona Tanib of Irtah when Occupation authorities constructed the Barrier on their farm destroying 60 of their 80 dunums of farmland (Interview, 7/16/08). In other instances the impact of such infrastructure is indirect, for example when the Barrier is placed between the built-up area of a town and its surrounding farmland. Such is the
case in the Palestinian village of Jayyous where the route of the Barrier separates farmers in the village from their farms surrounding the village. In order to cross a gate in the barrier to get to their land, these farmers have to obtain a permit from Israeli authorities, but these authorities have denied permits for 80% of these farmers and thus their farmland is inaccessible to them (United Nations, 2008 and my own interviews). Either way, through direct confiscation of land, or through the placement of infrastructure, what is occurring is the shrinkage of Palestinian cropland under cultivation, and the continuing deterioration of the Palestinian farm. More importantly, as farms are compromised, Palestinians lose a critical anchor securing them to the landscape.

What began as a process of re-imagining land in the late 19th century has assumed a legal status and material reality on the landscape. This landscape of towns and farms erased, and towns isolated has provoked demographic changes that have moved Palestinians out of historic Palestine, or into smaller and more restricted territorial spaces inside Israel and in the Occupied Territories. Transferred to new locations, many Palestinians have assumed the status of refugees, or in remaining within Israel or the Occupied Palestine, as a landless, unemployed and impoverished underclass. In the end, the landscape has emerged with a character and identity far different from what it had been.

**Concluding Remarks**

In his inquiry into the origins of modern power in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault found in the idea of space and its various manifestations such as environment, place and landscape, the key to understanding the mechanics of domination and submission in modern society (Philo, 2002). For Foucault, modern power was a manifestation occurring within enclosed spaces where individuals were regimented to become compliant with new imperatives for order. These new control imperatives were generated by economic, political, and demographic changes originating in the 18th century that spearheaded the transition to modern society and the need for new forms of authority over society’s human subjects. Foucault’s great insight was in revealing how the control over, and partitioning of spatial environments disciplined human subjects to submit to authority in a way that conformed to the new demands of modern society for order and control. In this way, space operated in the service of modern power and submission.
Foucault's basic insight about the spatial modalities of domination lies at the core of territoriality, the practice of power referring to the way individuals or groups reorganize the material life, politics, and culture of a place by reshaping landscape. This article draws on Foucault's insight about the spatial modalities of power, and the idea of territoriality in posing a question about the historical meaning of the enclosed and partitioned landscape in Palestine: how does the remaking of landscape provided an ongoing theme in a story about the exercise of power and transition to the modern world? This article addresses this problem comparatively by focusing on two cases separated in time and place, the enclosures in England and the enclosed partitioned landscape in Palestine today. Examined comparatively, both cases emphasize the continuity of power and space as a theme shaping passages to modern society.

A pattern of territoriality focusing on the enclosure of landscape ties these two cases together. These two cases reveal how English estate owners and Jewish Zionists re-imagine territorial landscapes, and exploit their power over groups anchored to the land in order to realize an imagined vision of modernity. Upon re-imagining landscape, groups with territorial ambitions use two basic instruments to realize their imagined vision. They use the law, specifically laws of property, to impose a new structure of sovereignty on the land, enlisting the state to help implement a new rulemaking framework that redefines entitlement to, use of, and circulation across land; and they use the built environment to reinforce and extend legal changes in systems of sovereignty on the land. These two instruments play a critical role in demographic transformations in which groups with territorial ambitions succeed in effecting the transfer of populations as precondition and outcome of remaking landscape. The symmetries in the two cases – the processes of imagining the landscape, and using law and the built environment to reorder it – suggest that making private property and making Jewish property are part of the same ongoing interplay of power and space so central in Foucault's interpretation of modernity. This process of re-imagining land, and using systems of legality and architecture to remake it and transfer populations, is the basis of enclosure.

In developing a line of continuity between enclosure in England and Palestine, this article suggests that the two basic but often overlapping routes to modernity embedded in these cases, the development of capitalism and the development of nationalism, are comparable as projects of power and spatial ordering. At the same time, this conclusion about continuity and comparability in the two cases also has practical, present-day consequences. Although
contending that their policies on the land in Palestine are the result of circumstances unique to the region, Israeli Zionists emerge in this argument as practitioners of power and reorganizers of space little different from English landowners who in an earlier age remade land to generate more revenue. Both groups use power to transform land in accordance with an imagined vision emphasizing how, even in very different contexts, one involving conflict between classes, the other identity conflict, power assumes a spatial dimension on the landscape.

If enclosure is a tendency of modern power, and if English estate owners and Jewish Zionists share a certain likeness in remaking and enclosing land, then it would seem that between these points in time are other historical environments reflecting a similar logic. Foucault would likely concur. Modernity as the exercise of power and the remaking of space marches on.

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Notes

1 Open fields and common fields were not always identical. Common fields were largely open and unenclosed but not all common fields were open, nor were all open fields common (Kerridge, 1992: 5–16; Thirsk, 1964; 1966).

2 Wage labor was actually of long standing in the English countryside. Most small commons were at least partially engaged in some wage work to supplement farm incomes Consequently, rather than pushing proprietied smallholders into wage-dependent proletarians, Parliamentary enclosure eroded the non-wage sources of subsistence thus leaving them more completely dependent upon wage work (Humphries, 1990: 18–19).

3 It was not always the case that small holders were forced to sell their allotments. In upland areas of the North it was normal to allocate the smaller allotments contiguous with, or as close as possible to existing holdings while the manorial allotment was often on more remote, poorer land. These were areas, however, not as affected by Parliamentary enclosure.

4 This notion of transfer that came to prevail within the Zionist movement is admittedly different from the transfer of population resulting from the enclosures in England. Although in England in the late 18th century there were fervent advocates of using enclosure as a tool to move commoners socially and spatially into the ranks of a wage earning class, in the case of enclosure in Palestine the transfer of population was far more the result of conscious design and policy.

5 “Jewish leaders . . . strove to gain possession and ownership of as much of Israel's sovereign space as possible by making use of the legal mechanisms of the state at their disposal (Forman and Kedar, 2004: 812).
6 This figure of 700 new Jewish settlements comes from Zureik (2001: 89).
7 For a detailed description of how Israel has misused its own law, see B’Tselem, (2002: 30–49).
9 Admittedly, in some cases, Palestinians are allowed into settlements as manual laborers.
10 This insight on “camps” comes from Ophir (2004).

References


