Landscapes of Power: British Enclosure and the Palestinian Geography

Gary Fields
Department of Communication, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0503 U.S.A.

This article explores one of the most fundamental relationships in human geography, the interplay of power and space, in reinterpreting the landscape of enclosure in Palestine today by comparing it to the landscape of the British enclosures in the 18th century. The question addressed in this article is, How does the exercise of power assume attributes on the land? In this argument, enclosing and remaking landscapes is a historically enduring practice of power consisting of two basic elements: a legal element that redefines rights of property by reorganizing systems of ownership, use, access, and socio-economic relations on the land and architectural elements that complement legalities of property and reshape the landscape itself.

British landowners and Israeli Zionists are parallel actor groups, using law and the architectural environment as instruments to weaken the anchors holding less powerful groups to land, substituting themselves as the land’s rightful owners and stewards, and remaking life on the landscape. The article concludes by revealing how the enclosure of landscapes conforms to the aims of modern power holders, from capitalist-minded English landowners to nationalist-inspired Israeli Zionists.

Keywords: landscape, power, territoriality, enclosure, property rights, Palestine

In an extremely insightful observation about the relationship of power to landscape, W. J. T. Mitchell argues that landscape is best understood not as a noun but as a verb (2002, 1). While conceding that landscape is capable of marking meanings and of being read as a “text,” Mitchell seeks to emphasize the role of landscape as a “process” and to reposition landscape at the centre of the theoretical nexus between power and space known as territoriality. In the broad sense, territoriality assigns a socially constructed meaning to geography by elevating the role of human intervention and human decision making in...
disciplining and developing the landscape (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, xi). More specifically, it refers to “human agency on the land” (Mukerji 1997, 2) marked by “the effort of an individual or group to influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack 1986, 19). To landscape is thus to assert control over human activity by shaping the contours of territorial space. It is in this way that “landscape” is an action word corresponding to the exercise of power. Yet at the same time, if the path to power leads through landscape, then landscape is more than a process. It is also an instrument for the exercise of power. Consequently, landscape has a threefold relationship to power. It is a text communicating power; it is a process—an activity—for seeking power; and it is an instrument for achieving power.

There is arguably no better example of the relationship between power and landscape today than on the deliberately fragmented and partitioned landscape of Palestine. Here, landscape is a text communicating power in the starkest of terms. It is an activity for control over people and human activity. And, finally, the Palestinian landscape is an instrument of control used by one group of people to dominate another.

In what ways is the Palestinian landscape part of a more enduring lineage focusing on the relationship between power and space? This article addresses this question by situating the Palestinian landscape within a historically long-standing narrative about the interplay of power and space and by comparing it to the landscape of the British enclosures of the late 18th century. Though seemingly removed from one another, these two cases share striking parallels.

Throughout England after 1750, a revolution in the countryside was rendering much of the landscape unrecognizable (Bermingham 1986, 9). In order to make their estates more profitable, estate owners were aggressively claiming title to land historically held in common, buying out or otherwise dispossessioning small farmers who benefited from access to collectively owned land. In the process, small cultivators, already under pressure, disappeared almost entirely or re-emerged on the landscape in new roles, consigned to the enlarged estates as wage earners or as labourers in newly established rural and urban industries, where they had to acclimate to an altogether different disciplinary rhythm of time and work (Thompson 1967). In this way, one group of people, anchored to the landscape through a system of legal and customary rights, was uprooted and transferred to other locations, where they assumed a different economic role and a new social status.

What facilitated these changes on the landscape was the phenomenon of parliamentary enclosure, a series of Acts of Parliament that transformed the system of land tenure from one in which occupants enjoyed access to land and the right to use it as a collective resource to one in which land came under new legalities of control by individuals (Turner 1986). At the same time, this legal change reshaped the countryside with untold miles of stone walls, hedges, and fences, built by the promoters of enclosure not only to demarcate their enlarged holdings but also to restrict access to what was once an open system of land cultivation with free movement across land and rights to access and use land as a shared resource (Blomley 2007). These material barriers, reinforcing institutional change on the land, imposed new disciplinary practices on the landscape and, for peasant commoners, signalled the closure of the countryside (Neeson 1993, 5). In the end, the landscape assumed a new character, partitioned into private spaces off limits to the individual small farmers who had once circulated relatively unimpeded across its contours.

The thesis of this article is that the efforts of British landowners to remake the landscape into a series of private spaces and the efforts of Israeli Zionists to remake the
Palestinian landscape into a series of Jewish spaces are comparable applications of force to space. Such an argument does not seek to overlook the differences in these two cases. Clearly, the project of building a capitalist-based, private-property-oriented system of agriculture on the landscape and the project of building a nationalist-based, ethno-religious nation-state on the land derive from different sets of aspirations related to the disparities in time and geography reflected in the two cases. What is far more compelling, however, is the degree to which these two seemingly disparate historical and geographical environments share fundamental attributes. One of the primary aims of comparative historical sociology is to use comparison with the past to provide insight into the nature of problems in the present (Skocpol and Somers 1980; Fields 2004). One of the most urgent analytical problems raised in the environment of the Palestinian landscape is the nature of modern power. This article seeks to go beyond what is obviously unique about the exercise of power in this region by focusing on its comparative dimensions, in this way creating a broader frame for understanding the role of force on the Palestinian geography. What this comparison reveals, in the end, is that claims made by the practitioners of power for their actions in the Palestinian theatre are at best dubious, the reasons for their actions disingenuous. Both of these cases reflect the aims of dominant groups to establish different systems of power and sovereignty on the landscape; to overturn an existing system of rules and practices governing ownership, use rights, and patterns of circulation on the land and replace it with another. In effect, the power to make spaces on the landscape private and the power to make spaces on the landscape Jewish are comparable exercises in reconfiguring territorial boundaries. Both of these exercises in landscaping essentially remake the lines on a map and realign relations of power.

Enclosure, Power, and Space

With comparison as a method and territoriality as a frame, this article builds an argument about enclosure by posing a basic question: What is the nature of modern power, and how does it manifest on the land? In seeking answers to this question, this study uncovers parallels in the practice of power used by one group at the expense of another, consisting of two basic instruments: a legal instrument that redefines rights to property by reorganizing systems of ownership, use, access, and socio-economic relations on the land; and a set of architectural elements that reinforce the new legalities of property while recasting the landscape itself. This legal and architectural practice of power in remaking landscape defines enclosure.

In remaking land, dominant groups use both law and landscape architecture to weaken the anchors that hold subordinate groups to land. In England, the anchors securing subordinate groups to land are the open field village and the institution of common rights to land. In Palestine, the anchors securing Palestinians to land are the agrarian town and the family farm. What provides the catalyst for weakening these attachments, however, is an offensive program of legal and architectural instruments launched by dominant groups to create an alternative set of anchors that strengthens their dominant position as stewards upon the landscape. In England, the anchor spearheading this process of subordination and domination is the large-scale, profit-driven, “rent-maximizing farm” (Allen 1992). In Palestine, the anchor weakening Palestinian attachments to place while strengthening the landscape’s Jewish character is the Jewish settlement. As they proliferate across the landscape, the rent-maximizing farm and the Jewish settlement dispossess subordinate groups of their attachments to land and drive a set of demographic changes that move populations as both precondition and outcome of enclosing land.

What ignites the passions for enclosure
is a shift in outlook in which those with power imagine ways to “improve” the landscape. In England, this vision emerges from new thinking about property rights, inspired by John Locke (1690), who argued that entitlement to land derives from one’s labour to improve it. Locke’s ideas inspire landholders with a vision about opportunities to enforce new rules of ownership on land customarily given over to collective uses and rights by staking claims on their unique capacity to improve it and make it more productive. In Palestine, enclosure begins with a 19th-century vision, popularized by Theodor Herzl ([1896] 1934), to solve the problem of anti-Semitism by creating a homeland for the Jewish people. This vision, later refined by individuals from Ze’ev Jabotinsky (1923) to David Ben-Gurion, is also a redefinition of property rights and entitlement to land, seeking to remake the land where Palestinians reside, based on the belief that this territory belongs to the Jewish people. Such a belief inspires Zionist settlers of the early 20th century and their present-day descendants to improve land by altering its character from one in which Palestinians are its cultivators and stewards to one in which patterns of settlement, cultivation, and control on the land become Jewish. In this way, land improvement is a decisive element in what has been termed “imagining geography,” a process of collectively reinventing notions of territorial places and the basis of ideologies that justify a type of territorial conquest to conform to the invented vision (Said 1978). In both cases, groups with power imagine land differently and find the route to this imagined vision constrained by an existing pattern of attachments, rights, and socio-economic relationships anchoring others to the soil. Enclosure provides a pathway through this constraint.

Once imbued with a vision of land improvement, groups with power seek to impose a new structure of sovereignty over territory in order to implement this vision and transform patterns of ownership, use, and socio-economic relations on the land. Such exercises of power reshape territory by recasting the legal basis by which the less powerful exist on, circulate across, own, and use land. Altering these systems of ownership and access to land, in turn, involves a re-mapping of the space where people work and live. This practice reconfigures lines of inclusion and trespass, thereby reshaping the boundaries within which those with less power can circulate and what they can do on the land to which they retain access. In some instances, re-mapping landscape and reshaping systems of access involves directly taking land from those living and working on it. In other instances, it annuls rights to access and use land in a certain way. Alongside this re-mapping are material transformations in which forms of architecture are deployed on the landscape by those with power to reinforce, practically and communicatively, the legal impacts of enclosing land. In this way, legal change in property systems, in combination with physical infrastructure, alters the way people exist on and circulate across land (Blomley 2007). This re-mapping of space weakens the systems of attachment by which less powerful “subalterns” are anchored to territory.

In dislodging these anchors holding subalterns to land, enclosure, even in different circumstances, employs similar mechanisms and exhibits similar impacts focusing on the notion of population transfer. Such movements of people, however, are typically conceived as forced migrations from one location to another. This study broadens the notion of population transfer by conceiving of transfer not only as a change in the location of populations but also as a change in their social standing. Often, these processes are interdependent. Processes of transfer, in turn, are wrought by different gradients of power. Thus, when enclosing land, dominant groups move populations by resorting to measures such as outright expropriation but also, at the same time, induce transfer through less overt “legal” measures of force, manipulating the...
conditions of existence on the land through application of the law thereby coercing populations to “choose” migration as a remedy. This process of moving populations spatially and socially to remake land is both a mechanism and a final goal of enclosure. When, in the wake of transfer, the anchors securing one group of people to land are weakened and a more powerful group assumes ownership and control of that land, and when the new group implements a different pattern of socioeconomic activities on the land, enclosure is achieved and the land assumes a new identity.

In England, enclosure, by abrogating security of land tenure and, in certain cases, dispossessing peasant smallholders, transfers members of this group from agrarian activities on the land, anchored by common rights, into activities on the land connected to a new status as wage earners. As enclosure expands, many are driven from their rural origins altogether, emerging as wage workers in cities. In Palestine, similarly, enclosure transfers Palestinians from agrarian activities into a new status as wage earners inside Israel by dispossessing them of land and property (Shafir and Peled 2002, 112–25). At the same time, enclosure spirits Palestinians to different locations, many outside the boundaries of historic Palestine, where they assume still another new status as refugees. In both cases, legal and physical changes grafted onto territory act as catalysts for the process of transfer by altering rights of ownership and tenure on land, by changing how land can be used, and by restricting circulation across space.

By revealing these patterns of power on the landscape, this article also makes an argument about the relationship of enclosure to the two basic routes to modernity, the development of capitalism and the development of nationalism. Typically, enclosure in England is interpreted as pivotal in the transition to industrial society and is thus attached to the lineage of modernity associated with capitalist development (Allen 1992). By contrast, Palestinian enclosure is typically assigned to the lineage of modernity marked by the territorial aspirations of cultural groups associated with nationalism (Yiftachel 2002). By uncovering parallels in the two cases, this study reveals how the exercise of power and the recasting of place is fundamental to both lineages of modernity, reinforcing the complementary character of capitalist development and nation building (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). The study addresses questions of what made territoriality integral to modernity and how remaking land conformed to the aims of modern power holders, from English landowners to Israeli Zionists. What follows are the contours of these parallel worlds, organized around two themes: the imaginings of the dominant groups that made them want to remake landscapes, and the instruments that enabled them to do so.

British Enclosure

Enclosure in England is a story about power, property, and landscape. In its earliest manifestations in the 15th century, the practice was marked by the informal, piecemeal efforts of farmers to create larger, more consolidated landholdings. Since that time, the practice of reorganizing property holdings by enclosing land has emerged as the factor most decisive in reshaping the landscape of the English countryside. By the mid-18th century, however, the practice changed. Although in this new period enclosure still aimed at creating larger landholdings, it was distinguished from piecemeal enclosures by the formal intervention of Parliament in the process. Parliamentary enclosure offered landowners state support for a program of redeeming the landscape from those supposedly resistant to, or incapable of, improving it.

As public policy, parliamentary enclosure provided institutional support for a new agrarian economy in which large farms absorbed small farms while the new owners leased the amalgamated holdings to tenants...
who cultivated the land with wage labourers (Allen 1992, 1). In this transition, estate owners, backed by Parliament, levered enclosure to gain greater control over the way they could secure and use land (Rollison 1984, 312). This “landlord’s revolution” was part of a transformation in which a system of open field cultivation, tied to rights for the common use of land, gradually met its end (Allen 1992; Neeson 1993). In order for this metamorphosis to be completed, however, the system of rights anchoring peasant commoners to the soil had to be replaced with new rules governing ownership of, access to, and control over land. Parliamentary enclosure provided this institutional platform aimed at redeeming land from one set of owners and users and transferring control of it to another (Turner 1986).

On the landscape itself, the phenomenon spearheading this redistribution, which essentially buried the system of open fields tied to common rights, was the “rent maximizing farm,” an enlarged, amalgamated landholding driven by the land hunger of large estates (Allen 1992, 85–89). It was the rent-maximizing farm that spread across the landscape, acting as a solvent upon the bonds securing peasant smallholders to land. As these bonds weakened, and as peasant smallholders lost anchors to their open-field villages, many drifted to the enclosed and amalgamated farms, as wage earners, or to rural and urban industries (Neeson 1993, 5–9). By the end of the 18th century only a small fraction of the landscape remained populated by owner-occupied family farms. This decline was not only a change from the late 17th century but a “revolutionary change” (Allen 1992, 85). Through this process, land assumed a new character, cultivated by wage labour, and a new appearance, enlarged and amalgamated but at the same time bounded and enclosed. These transformations are inscribed upon the landscape, in which walls and fences demarcating enclosed land—some still standing today—tell a story about power and place.

### Imagining Enclosure

Parliamentary enclosure has its roots in a new outlook toward land embraced by cross-sections of English landed society and their allies in Parliament (Wade Martins 2004, 3–17). Central to this reassessment was a different way of thinking about property rights that gained support within these two groups after 1650. What reinforced this shift in thinking about property, in turn, was an Enlightenment vision of progress that inspired the idea of “improving” land. As this discourse about progress, land improvement, and property rights sharpened, enclosure emerged as a practical means to fulfil these abstract aims. At the same time, what enabled enclosure to evolve from a private activity to a parliamentary concern was a parallel discourse proclaiming land improvement to be in the national interest (Wade Martins 2004, 7–17). Such reasoning entitled landowners, influenced by ideas of progress with aspirations to land improvement, to seek help from government in accomplishing what was depicted as a public purpose.

Among those with a prominent role in promoting this new outlook was John Locke. For him, humans in a “state of nature” had access to property in common, but with the advent of agriculture, individuals were vested with rights to land based on their capacity to improve it through labour. If land could be made more productive through work, Locke reasoned, then the improver of that land had a private right to it, and he could use enclosure to secure the benefits of that right.

Locke’s philosophical sentiments on property assumed a practical orientation among a broad range of agrarian writers, notably Arthur Young, who emerged as arguably the most influential critic of open-field farming and promoter of enclosure. For Young, enclosure was critical in raising rents, creating larger farms, and achieving the productivity gains needed to improve
agriculture. High rents, he argued, encouraged the tenant farmer to be more productive while discouraging the proliferation of smaller farmers, who, he insisted, were impervious to improvement (Young 1770, Vol. 3, Letter XLII, 321-322). At the same time, if high rents provided incentives for productivity gains, large farms encouraged the capital-intensive techniques needed for improvement. Great farms “are the soul of the agricultural improvement,” Young insists: “split them into [small] tenures” and “you will find nothing but beggars and weeds” (Young, 1771, 67). Because of its critical role in promoting large, capital-intensive farming, enclosure was “the first and greatest of all improvements” (Young 1797, 30).

Critics of enclosure also appealed to the national interest, arguing that open fields and common rights were in fact the basis for the efficient techniques indispensable to feeding the nation (Neeson 1993, 25). Enclosure compromised the nation, they insisted, by concentrating wealth and impoverishing the common farmer who provided the nation’s food. Eliminate open-field farming, they argued, and you undermine, not enhance, economic efficiency. What these critics most feared, however, in defending open fields, were the impacts of parliamentary enclosure in transforming the commoner into a wage earner. For the commoner, the open-field economy entailed freedom from the wage system. By contrast, dependence on the wage was the first step toward arbitrary reductions in pay, impoverishment, and, ultimately, migration and the depopulation of villages. What these opponents of parliamentary enclosure aimed to avoid was the expansion of a wage-earning class and the disappearance of an agrarian economy tied to a system of relative wage independence (Neeson 1993, 25).

Despite these appeals, purveyors of parliamentary enclosure prevailed in the debate, but, as enclosure gained momentum in two distinct waves from 1750 through 1830, the debate, far from ending, assumed a different tone (Turner 1980, 67–68). In the earlier stages of the debate, promoters of enclosure insisted that it had no adverse impacts. By 1760, enclosure advocates, led by men such as the Rev. John Howlett, a close friend of Young, conceded that enclosure created a wage system and depopulated villages but, in this new period, defended these outcomes as virtuous. Enclosure, they argued, would bring rural populations into manufacturing while creating a wage-dependent workforce for the large estates. This change in the status of the rural population would lead to greater agricultural yields and more stable grain prices. In effect, the creation of a wage-dependent agricultural and manufacturing population, which previously had supported arguments against enclosure, now justified the practice (Neeson 1993, 27).

Such sentiments about the desirability of wage labour were consistent with ideas, emerging in the late 18th century, that focused on markets and the division of labour articulated by Adam Smith. For Smith, markets were the key to national wealth creation, while at the same time it was the division of labour that provided the source of growth in markets, emphasizing how the two were mutually reinforcing (Smith [1776] 1976, 13–36). Nevertheless, the division of labour was not restricted to activity internal to the factory. The division of labour was a social phenomenon both internal and external to the workshop (Perelman 2000). The dilemma facing Smith and other market advocates was how to recruit a class of wage earners for the specialized work in factories that was needed to promote the growth of markets. Such a project required measures that would restrict the viability of traditional activities in the countryside and compel people to work for wages. Consequently, the creation of markets had a demographic and territorial dimension. Embedded in the promotion of markets and the creation of a specialized labouring class was a process of transferring individuals into
new activities and relocating them in new places. Such a process, in both its social and its spatial dimensions, would have profound ramifications for the land.

It was in this context—the desirability of creating a wage-earning class—that a complementary argument emerged in favour of enclosure as sound public policy: that of “social discipline” (Thompson 1963, 219). Indeed, the Board of Agriculture (a semi-public organization founded in 1793 to advocate for a general enclosure act) argued that a wage-dependent workforce was of value to society (Neeson 1993, 28). Dependent on wages, commoners would be forced into working on the enclosed farms, which, according to many advocates of enclosure, were often at a loss for labour. Enclosure, insisted its promoters, such as John Clark of Herefordshire, would compel commoners to take up “an honest employment, instead of losing time in idleness and waste” (from Snell 1985, 170).

Similarly, supporters of parliamentary enclosure argued that the common economy needed improvement because, absent property rights, it was primitive (Neeson 1993, 30). Locke himself contributed to this view by earlier characterizing Native American society as inferior because it lacked property rights (Banner 2005, 46–48). Preserving common right was thus akin to leaving North America to the Indians. Abrogating common right, in turn, was a pathway to redeeming land from its primitive and unimproved state. Arguably, it was John Sinclair, president of the Board of Agriculture, who likened the common economy most strongly to a primitive age; inspired by the Napoleonic wars, he insisted in 1803 on subduing it much like a foreign enemy. “Let us not be satisfied with the liberation of Egypt, or the subjugation of Malta,” writes Sinclair, “but let us subdue Finchley Common,” forcing those in its wake “to submit to the yoke of improvement” (qtd. in Neeson 1993, 31). In this way, land improvement became codified through metaphors of colonization, civilization, and conquest. What began as a vision to improve agrarian productivity evolved into an ideology promoting the redemption of land from those who would keep it primitive, unenclosed, and thus unimproved.

**Instruments of Enclosure**

Once landholders became convinced that building the “great farm” and eliminating common rights offered them opportunities to secure greater returns from land, they developed mechanisms for enclosing land and achieving these aims that consisted of two basic instruments (Whyte 2003, 9). The first was legal. Parliamentary enclosure removed communal rights for peasant commoners attached to an area of land, usually within a village or parish, and substituted a new structure of ownership of that land, usually by a single owner. Such an instrument, in recasting rights of property, expressed a relation of power through a legal discourse about rights of access and trespass on the landscape. This instrument, in effect, laid the foundation for a new structure of privatized spaces on the landscape. Such spaces, once open and accessible, re-emerged as closed and off limits to peasant commoners. The second instrument was architectural. It entailed the demarcation of the enclosed land with a wall, hedgerow, or fence. Such architectural emplacements also expressed a relation of power in terms of rights of access and trespass on the landscape, but in this case power emerged not only communicatively but also materially. Similar to the legal instrument, walls, hedgerows, and fences also created closed areas that pre-empted circulation across the landscape. Together, the legal removal of rights to use land as a common resource and the physical impediment to freedom of movement were mutually reinforcing in reconstituting the routes of access and the boundaries of trespass on the landscape. It was through both law and landscape architecture that estate owners created the enlarged
privatized spaces of the great farms—the rent-maximizing farms—and, in the process, established a landscape with very different socio-economic practices, a different demography, and a different identity.

Two anchors essentially secured peasant commoners to the landscape. One was the institution of common use rights on the land; the other was the practice of open-field cultivation. Together, these two anchors enabled peasant commoners to maintain a living from the land. What made common rights and open fields viable as income-producing institutions, however, was a system of open access and circulation on the landscape, unimpeded by rules of trespass and impassible boundaries.

Common rights were of two types. There were those designated legally and registered in local manorial courts. There were also common rights exploited through sufferance (custom), where consent was implied by lack of interference. Whether legally or by sufferance, the right to exploit resources from land held by members of a parish or village in common acted as an income supplement for smaller cultivators. This supplement was what enabled many to secure a livelihood just beyond the Malthusian threshold. Furthermore, what common rights and open fields provided to small peasant cultivators was a material barrier separating many in this group from a life completely dependent on work for wages.3

For the small farmer, the most important source of income deriving from the commons came from grazing. The ability to graze stock on common land, or on the wastes of harvested crops on open fields, and to exploit the products from cowkeeping—milk, butter, and cheese—either through consumption or from sale, had roughly the same value as working for wages. In this sense, the labourer’s cow, stocked from common pasture, was worth as much as wage work (Humphries 1990, 24).

Other rights of the commons were also important as supplements to income. There were opportunities for obtaining free fuel, defined as rights of turbary (rights to dig for peat) and estover (rights to cut wood). There were rights to hunt on common land for wild birds and small game such as rabbits. There were rights to forage for dietary supplements such as berries, fruits, and nuts. Additionally, there were opportunities to craft useful items (such as brooms) from materials on common land. Whatever could be scavenged from the land rather than purchased was exploited. In this sense, common rights enabled the earning of incomes that depended on a landscape of open access.

By establishing new rules of trespass over the territorial spaces where peasant commoners pursued these rights, and by reinforcing these rules with physical barriers, the instruments of enclosure weakened a form of economic organization tied specifically to the landscape. What changed in the process was a set of agrarian practices anchored to the landscape by common rights and an open physical organization on the land. Once these anchors were weakened by the remaking of boundaries on the landscape, the peasant commoner became more mobile, both socially and spatially. A greater dependence on wage work enabled peasant commoners to transfer to a different status as well to new locations, social and demographic changes that eventually became inscribed upon the landscape itself.

Playing a decisive role as a solvent for peasant agriculture tied to common rights, the rent-maximizing farm launched a series of socio-economic and demographic changes on the landscape. Driven by the efforts of estate owners to secure new sources of revenue, these farms increased rental income for estate owners in two ways: by expanding the amount of land under cultivation or pasture and by thinning out the number of agricultural workers arrayed upon the enlarged footprint of cultivation or pasture. Rental increases accrued to estates from the increase in total land under their
control (with less land held in common) and from the way these farms could be subdivided into larger tenancies, supplanting the small open-field family farm. This twofold process—colonizing formerly common land and bringing it into cultivation or pasture under the ownership of the estates, and expanding the size of tenancies on these larger pieces of land—is what enabled the enclosure process to diminish the numbers working the land and to act as a catalyst for socio-economic and demographic change on the landscape.

After landholders became convinced that common rights and open fields were an impediment to generating more income from land, their decision to enclose was driven by perceptions of the costs and returns of enclosure (Turner 1984, 36–83; Whyte 2006, 97). For the landholder, the costs of enclosure focused on one element: the walling and fencing of land allotments awarded to enclosure recipients. To make enclosure feasible, landowners had to offset the expenses of building barriers to demarcate enclosed land, typically two-thirds of enclosure costs (Clark 1998, 100). Rental increases expected from enclosure enabled landowners to offset these costs.

The logic of using enclosure to secure higher rents, in turn, depended on raising productivity on the land, but the source of the productivity advance from enclosure stemmed not from higher yields per acre but from having more land under cultivation or pasture and fewer workers tending the enlarged holdings. As David Ricardo noted in his theory of rent, agricultural improvements capable of generating higher rents are of two types: those that increase yields on the land, and those that enable society to obtain the same yields with less labour (1817 [1974], 42). The increases in rental income captured by large estate farms stemmed from the second type, that is, improvements in labour productivity. Coupled with the expanded areas of cultivation and pasture, enhancements in labour productivity enabled the land to produce greater output with fewer workers.

Estates enlarged by enclosure exploited this productivity advantage and captured more rent by recasting tenancies on the land, creating the 200-acre tenancies that supplanted the 50-acre open-field family farm (Allen 1992, 86, 211–15). With fewer families on the landscape requiring a minimum level of subsistence, with enlarged landholdings, and with land generating greater aggregate levels of output with fewer hands, estates from 1750 to 1790 were able to redirect productivity gains back to themselves; large estate owners were able to increase rents by at least 40 to 50%, in most cases much higher (Mingay 1994, 48). The expectation of rent increases from larger land holdings, in turn, gave estate owners incentives to acquire even more land through enclosure. While estates had initiated large-scale land acquisitions prior to the mid-18th century in order to create bigger, labour-saving, income-enhancing farms—such farms had already enabled English agrarian productivity to surpass that of France by 1750—parliamentary enclosure provided an institutional mechanism for strengthening the trend toward larger farms and accelerating these productivity gains (Allen 1992, 212–17). With fewer workers, these farms created pressure for the social and spatial movement of populations.

As parliamentary enclosure encouraged the creation of larger, less labour-intensive farms, it reinforced demographic changes differentiating England from Europe. Beginning in 1750, as population growth in England began to outpace that in Europe, dramatic shifts were occurring in patterns of urban and rural growth. From 1700 to 1800, the urban population in England increased threefold, to 24% of the total population, while in north-west Europe, the region geographically and economically most proximate to England, urbanization accounted for only 10% of the population in 1800 (Wrigley 1989, 177). Even more compelling were the...
changes in the rural population. Although the number of rural inhabitants increased dramatically from 1750 to 1801, what is striking is the decline of the rural population working in agriculture and the increase in the rural non-agricultural population, so that by 1801 rural agricultural and non-agricultural populations were identical in size (see Table 1). It was this trend—the growth in the rural population working outside agriculture—that distinguished English demography in this period (Wrigley 1989, 190).

What these trends reveal is a population transferred in two related ways. One type of transfer was social: cast from their farms, these rural inhabitants became completely dependent on wage work in agriculture and rural industry. The other type of transfer was spatial; it involved the movement of rural populations into cities. Parliamentary enclosure, although not the singular cause of these demographic trends, reinforced and accelerated them.

Surprisingly, it was Arthur Young who offered some of the most explicit evidence of losses by smallholders, admitting how a typical enclosure commissioner “had been an accessory to injuring at least 2,000 poor people” (Young 1801, 20). The smallholder, he argued, “may as well have nothing allotted to him,” because the large owner, with first choice on enclosure allotments, “renders the holding of the small farmer untenable.” Thus “the small owner must sell his property to his rich and opulent adjoining neighbor; and that, … decreases population” (Young 1813, 117).

This trend, observed by Young, of smallholders’ being compelled to sell what in the absence of common rights became unviable holdings is part of a broader demographic process of transfer. As late as 1688, between 33% and 66% of land was still owned by small freeholders; by 1801, this figure had dropped to 10% (Allen 1992, 85). Whether by force or by “choice,” small farmers were leaving their farms in the wake of the advance of great farms, assuming different identities in new places. At the same time, the legal and architectural instruments of parliamentary enclosure that transformed the socio-economy and demography of the open-field village became imprinted materially on the landscape itself.

Prior to parliamentary enclosure, the characteristic spatial form for open-field villages was circular, deriving from the strips of farmland arranged in rings around the built-up area of the parish, and open, without barriers to impede circulation and with roads, tracks, and footpaths of irregular design connecting the homesteads in the village to the fields, meadows, and commons (Barrell 1972, 103–4; Whyte 2003, 7). By 1760, following the first wave of parliamentary enclosure, the landscape emerged with a more linear grid of large square or rectangular landholdings; wider, straighter access roads; and a new pattern of walls, hedges, and fences demarcating these changes (Whyte 2003, 63). Proliferating across the landscape and spearheading these changes was the large-scale rent-maximiz-

### Table 1: Population trends in England

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population (millions)</th>
<th>Urban population (millions)</th>
<th>Urban population as % of total</th>
<th>Rural agricultural population (millions)</th>
<th>Rural Non-agricultural population (millions)</th>
<th>Rural Non-agricultural population as % of rural total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ing farm. By the end of the 18th-century, parliamentary enclosure had created the greatest single areal change in the land within the shortest comparable time span, producing what was described as a “Georgian” landscape characterized by a more sharply demarcated set of boundaries on the land with closed rights of way stemming from the roughly 200,000 miles of newly erected walls, hedges, and fencing (Turner 1980, 16; Rackham 1986, 190–91). It was a revolution in the spatial organization of the agrarian landscape, reflecting a social and economic transformation that effectively closed the countryside (Whyte 2003, 4; Neeson 1993, 5). Communicated in this landscape were very different concepts of ownership and control over land, along with a new social order and a new source of power in the countryside.

At the core of this reorganization of landscape, as we have seen, was an institutional change, spawned by an ideology of improving land, that created larger farms, fewer workers, and a demographic process whereby those on the land moved into greater dependence on wage work and new locations for work and living. Many who owned land either lost it or sold it, becoming rural and urban wage earners with a different relationship to the soil, while tenants lost leases and also became “free.” In the end, the landscape assumed a new character, supporting a different agrarian economy. What was once open had become bounded. Where once there was free access, there was now closure. What was initially “imagined” had become part of the landscape. The privatized spaces grafted upon the land by law and landscape architecture succeeded in redirecting the spatial circulation pattern of peasants’ bodies while disciplining them to behave in new ways (Blomley 2007, 4).

Palestinian Enclosure

If the story of the British enclosure movement is a story about privatizing land, driven by passions for profit, enclosure in Palestine is a story about “Judaizing” land, driven by the passions of nationalism (Yiftachel 2006). Spawned by the nationalist impulses of Zionist ideology, this project has as its primary aim to “de-Arabize” and unmake Palestine as Palestinian, remaking this territory into something Jewish (Falah 2003). The historical geography of the Palestinian landscape attests to the thoroughness of this effort. In 1947, Jewish public agencies and private investors owned roughly 6% of the land in Palestine, while Palestinian Arabs owned roughly 90%. Today, these figures are almost exactly reversed (Usher 2005, 27; COHRE and BADIL 2005).

This enclosure and redemption of land in Palestine unfolds in two phases. The initial phase begins in the late 19th century, when Zionist leaders, in an effort to confront the problem of anti-Semitism, advocated the creation of a “haven” in Palestine for Jews (Khalidi 2005). The second phase begins with the realization of this aim with the establishment of Israel in 1947–48. This phase itself can be divided into two periods, one from 1947–67, in which the Zionist movement remakes 78% of Palestine into a Jewish territory, and the other from 1967 to the present day, in which the Zionist project is poised to redeem the remaining portion. Although Palestinian territory is now divided into two areas, one the State of Israel, the other territory occupied by this state, the process of enclosure and land redemption is common to both and reveals similar features, emphasizing how both areas are part of the same geopolitical unit (Benvenisti 1995, 2000; Falah 2003; Yiftachel 2006, 8; BADIL and IDMC 2006, 59). It is with an imagined vision for this territorial unit that the story of enclosure and land redemption in Palestine begins.

Imagining Enclosure

While enclosure in Palestine has its origins in an imagined geography, the inspiration for
this imagined vision is 19th-century nationalism, which motivated segments of European Jewry to seek a homeland for the Jewish people. Such sentiment was part of a broader outlook, ascendant at that time, that affirmed the legitimacy of culturally differentiated groups’ rights to statehood. As a legitimate cultural group, Jews insisted upon their right to a territorial “container” within the discrete territorial spaces of the modern state system (Taylor 1994; Murphy 2002). From this nationalist-inspired vision emerged not only the idea of statehood but an ideology for redeeming territory—Zionism—in which enclosure and transfer became preferred tools.

Although Jews had begun to resettle in Palestine by the 1870s, it was Theodor Herzl ([1896] 1934) who popularized the idea of Jews establishing their own state, proposing Palestine as the territory most appropriate for this state-building enterprise. Such a program, however, posed a seemingly intractable problem: How was this territory, almost entirely Arab, to be remade as land with a Jewish character? Central to the ideology developed by Herzl and later Zionists to resolve this dilemma was the belief that Palestine belonged to the Jewish people by virtue of God’s will. Such a belief made it only logical to embrace enclosure and transfer as policies for redeeming the land and doing God’s work.

A critical aspect of Herzl’s vision, and one of the enduring principles of Zionism, was the non-recognition of the Arab population in Palestine and the designation of the area as empty land (Shlaim 2001, 5; Masalha 2001, 37–38). For Herzl, European settlement, with its industrious character, contrasted with the supposedly barren landscape and would “improve” the land. Zionists knew Palestine to be inhabited, but believed its remaking could be accomplished either by ignoring the local population or by convincing them that a prosperous Jewish state would be in their interests.

One Zionist sympathetic to statehood but otherwise hostile to ignoring or negotiating with Palestinians was Ze’ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940). Unlike other Zionists, Jabotinsky rejected notions of Palestine as empty while conceding the inevitability of Palestinians’ resisting Zionist colonization of their land. Nevertheless, he believed it impossible to expel the Arabs from Palestine—the course of action some of his colleagues were promoting—as a means of elevating the Jewish community to a position of demographic dominance in the area, a step considered essential by most Zionists for Jewish statehood. Absent transfer of the Palestinian population, the Zionist project was possible, he argued, “only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population—behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach” (Jabotinsky 1923). For Jabotinsky, the “iron wall” represented Jewish military power, which Zionism would have to use against Palestinians or abandon its aspirations (Shlaim 2001, 14).

If Jabotinsky was one to accept force but reject transfer as the solution to the Zionist dilemma, it was David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973) who eventually synthesized both ideas into a coherent ideology and program for Jewish statehood in Palestine. Like other Zionists at least partly inspired by socialism, Ben-Gurion was reluctant to promote the use of force to achieve statehood. After Palestinians resisted colonization during events known as the Arab Revolt of 1936–39, however, he accepted Jabotinsky’s view that military power, not negotiation, was necessary to accomplish Zionist aims (Shlaim 2001, 17). At the same time, the Revolt compelled Ben-Gurion to diverge from Jabotinsky and embrace transfer as the logic of force, insisting that transfer had always been the aim of Zionism while adding, “I don’t see in it [transfer] anything immoral” (qtd. in Morris 2001, 44). This synthesis of Ben-Gurion’s, emphasizing both force and transfer, would prevail as the dominant perspective within...
Zionism for the path to Jewish statehood.

As early as 1936, however, Zionists were already remaking Palestinian territory in accordance with these principles through a building program known as the homa umigdal (“tower and stockade”), which established Jewish settlements on the landscape to redeem land. Although seemingly defensive, these settlements were an offensive system of land development consisting of a “conquering troop” to seize the land, walls to preclude encroachment, and a tower to police the surroundings for what was considered hostile opposition (Rotbard 2003, 42). From 1936 to 1947 roughly 118 of these outposts were built, and not only to take control of land inside these communities. They aimed also at making the area surrounding the settlements de facto Jewish by rendering it dangerous, if not impossible, for Palestinians to access their own land adjacent to these enclaves—thereby effectively colonizing territory and redeeming land from Palestinians.

Essentially, the homa umigdal project translated an imagined geography of statehood into a landscape of built forms for modifying property rights and redeeming land. Reinforced by walls and towers, the homa umigdal settlements became prescient signals for the future landscape of the Zionist project. Moreover, this project revealed how the Zionist movement would use law and the built environment as instruments to enclose land and redistribute rights of ownership, access, and use on the landscape in the years to come when an historic opportunity presented itself and Israel emerged as a state.

**Instruments of Enclosure**

Ever since the Israeli state came into being in 1948, law and landscape architecture have driven the redemption of territory, both inside Israel and, later, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Together, these two instruments have served as the platform for the creation of the institution most responsible for the territorial redemption of Palestine. This institution is the Jewish settlement. 6

Inside Israel, this process of redeeming the landscape through settlement began with the passage of laws that elevated the status of Jews in the newly created state while circumscribing the rights of citizenship accorded to Arabs inside Israel with a legally differentiated status as non-Jewish. This legal distinction between Jews and non-Jews served as the precondition for redistributing rights of property between the two groups. Codified in this framework were institutions empowered to make decisions on the allocation of land based on religious identity and to transfer land and property from Arab to Jewish ownership (Forman and Kedar 2004).7 These legal changes inside Israel served as the prelude for launching Jewish settlements as the most potent architectural instruments on the ground for redeeming the landscape. The proliferation of Jewish settlements, in turn, has not only reallocated property by creating a series of new Jewish spaces but recast routes of access and trespass on the landscape, reshaping the Israeli landscape through an ever-expanding grid of Jewish spaces and an ever-increasing expanse of territorial spaces effectively alienated from Palestinians. Moreover, the export of these two instruments from Israel to the Occupied Territories, and the resulting shifts in the systems of ownership, use, and circulation on the occupied landscape, has enabled the geography of both areas to assume similar attributes. Both territories reveal a shrinking set of spaces where Palestinians can live and circulate and an expanding landscape of Jewish spaces effectively off limits to Palestinians. Ultimately, this landscape of ever-widening spaces of ownership and circulation for Israeli Jews and of ever-diminishing grids of ownership, use, and circulation for Palestinians has compromised those institutions of town and farm that anchor Palestinians to territory and...
place, both in Israel and in occupied Palestine.

From the beginning of state formation, the Jewish community in Israel used both law and architecture to undermine the viability as well as to erase the memory of the Palestinian town, as part of a project to redeem the landscape.

Inside Israel, this project of targeting the Palestinian town assumed two forms. One consisted of legally taking the land belonging to residents of the roughly 500 Arab villages and towns abandoned during the formation of the Israeli state in 1947–49, when Palestinians from these places took flight or were forcibly expelled by Zionist armed forces (Sitta 2000). Such expropriations constituted 66 % of the land seized from Palestinians inside Israel (Shafir and Peled 2002, 113). Upon expropriation, this land was insulated from claims by its former Palestinian owners by the Law of Absentee Property (1950), recast into a new status as Israeli state land by the Law of State Property (1951), and, as a final step toward transforming the landscape, reallocated for the construction of new Jewish settlements. As part of this process of expropriation and reallocation, innumerable homes of Palestinians were demolished as hundreds of villages were razed and the land graded and readied for construction of new Jewish towns. In this way, law and construction framed a new Israeli cartography, with Palestinian towns erased and replaced by 700 Jewish settlements arrayed upon the landscape of Israel (Zureik 2001, 89).

The other form of urban targeting inside Israel through legal and architectural instruments affected those Arab municipalities within the boundaries of the new Israeli state that survived the conflict of 1947–49. Like the emptied villages, land belonging to the surviving Israeli Arab towns was expropriated, converted to state property, and reallocated for the construction of Jewish settlements, destroying the fabric of Palestinian urbanization in Israel (Benvenisti 2000, 7). Through this policy of confiscation and settlement, Palestinian towns in Israel have lost their historically developed role as nodes in rural–urban and inter-urban networks for production, trade, and communications—the “urban systems” that sustain economic and social life. These linkages connected Palestinians towns to trade networks whereby the products of agriculture and urban handicraft circulated for sale in both agrarian villages and larger urban centres. Replacing this Palestinian urban system is a landscape of Jewish settlements, creating its own pattern of inter-urban and rural–urban trade while spawning an urban-based industrial structure linked to the world’s advanced industrial economies.

In addition, inside the Palestinian town itself, Israeli building law has made it difficult, if not impossible, for residents to obtain permits from local district planning authorities to expand their homes or to build anew. Consequently, Palestinians in Israel are forced to build illegally. If Israeli authorities discover such construction, however, they
can—and sometimes do—demolish the house or building. Such practices, even when they do not lead to demolition, effectively deter Palestinians from building through the fear of demolition (Yiftachel 1996). As part of a program targeting the Palestinian town, demolition effectively prevents these towns from expanding beyond their existing boundaries.

With their land taken, their environs occupied by new Jewish settlements, their boundaries constrained, and their linkages within urban systems fractured, Arab towns in Israel form an unconnected matrix of urban “reservations” on the landscape. Disconnected from other Arab towns, disenfranchised from the grid of connections to Jewish towns, and unable to expand, these towns are becoming excommunicated enclaves. In this way, the Palestinian town in Israel is being enclosed behind a series of legal and architectural barriers that sever the linkages necessary to a viable, sustainable urban environment.

Inside Israel, the system of land ownership, use, and circulation that now dominates the landscape has not only compromised the Palestinian town but shattered the system of agriculture that sustained these communities. Because of the proliferation of Jewish settlements built on land expropriated from Palestinian towns, the latter have lost access to their agricultural fields. Removed from the landscape in this process of land confiscation were the village-based family farms that anchored Palestinian agriculture. In their place emerged the Jewish kibbutz and moshav and, as these institutions faltered economically, the large agro-industrial farms that now dominate the agrarian landscape inside Israel. As a result, Palestinians inside Israel, cut off from access to their farms, are now dependent on wage work, mostly inside the Jewish settlements, a process of social transfer described as “the proletarianization of agrarian communities” (Shafir and Peled 2002, 112–25). Where the landscape once supported a system of Palestinian farms, it now supports a system of Jewish farms, often worked by Palestinian labourers.

Although duplicating these policies of land redemption in occupied Palestine, the state of Israel nevertheless applies the instruments of law and landscape architecture there with greater levels of overt, rather than subtle, force. As in Israel, the legal framework of property rights based on ethno-religious identity is the basis of land policy in occupied Palestine. Martial law, however, expands the discretionary power of this legal framework. With these legal tools, the Israeli government, much as it does in Israel, has empowered itself with the authority to confiscate Palestinian land and property and convert it into the property of its Jewish citizens. And, as in Israel, the legal power to confiscate land and property is the basis for what also functions, in occupied Palestine, as the most potent instrument for reallocating property and reconfiguring systems of circulation and trespass on the landscape, the Jewish settlement.

In the Occupied Territories, the roughly 200 Jewish settlements built on confiscated Palestinian territory are the central element in what has been termed a “matrix of control” exerted upon the Palestinian landscape (Halper 2002). Occupying confiscated land on innumerable West Bank hilltops, Jewish settlements in occupied Palestine have fragmented Palestinian territory into a landscape of impassible zones, and have done so more profoundly than any other element. First, wherever settlements are built, zones of trespass emerge on the landscape for Palestinians, since the latter are not allowed in or near settlements. Moreover, the roads built for these settlements, linking them together and connecting them to towns in Israel, create additional areas of the landscape off limits to Palestinians. In this way, territorial spaces where Palestinians once circulated—and that, in many instances, Palestinians once owned—are transformed into inaccessible zones of trespass. Second,
as settlements in the Occupied Territories increase in number and expand in size, so too do the efforts to control the circulation of Palestinians in, around, and between these areas. In the process, the entire landscape is transformed into areas of control, subdivided into spatial cells, in which passage from one cell to the next is supervised and regimented.

From these efforts to control circulation across the entire landscape emerges the checkpoint as an increasingly ubiquitous element of landscape architecture, critical to the matrix of control and corresponding to the ubiquity of the settlements themselves. The checkpoint functions as a spatial corridor linking adjacent spatial cells on the landscape, through which Palestinians must pass in moving from one area to another. In these corridors, Palestinian encounter friction, mostly in the form of long waits imposed by enclosure authorities before passage to an adjacent area is possible. Where Palestinians encounter this friction, they form “camps” upon the landscape, clusters of human beings immobilized and impeded from moving by the exercise of power enforced upon space.9 At any one time, there are hundreds of these camps distributed across the landscape. This matrix, and the fragmented and impassible zones emerging from it, is now being reinforced most dramatically by the instrument of landscape architecture referred to by the government of Israel as the “Security Fence” and by Palestinians as “The Wall.” By whatever name, 80 % of this roughly 760-km-long structure lies on land inside occupied Palestine, separating one Palestinian community from another.

Embedded in this matrix are the legal power to confiscate and reallocate property and the architectural power to reorder the landscape with built forms that complement this legal process of confiscation and reallocation with a system of fragmented and impassible areas.

As in Israel, this control matrix in occupied Palestine has succeeded in undermining the same institutional anchors of town and farm securing Palestinians to place and territory.

Similar to Arab towns inside Israel, Palestinian towns in the Occupied Territories possess small fractions of their former land inventory. Typical is the case of Husan, near Bethlehem. “We used to have 7 800 dunums of land,” says Ali Mustafa Shoshe, manager of the Husan Village Council. “From 1982 to ’86 Israeli authorities confiscated 5 200 dunums of land belonging to our farmers to build the settlement of Bettar Illit. After the settlement was built, we were left with only 2 400 dunums” (Shoshe 2006). In addition, the town in Occupied Palestine is the site of numerous demolitions of homes and property, similar to the Palestinian town in Israel. Since 1967, roughly 18 000 Palestinian houses have been demolished in the Occupied Territories, while at any one time there are more than 2 000 standing demolition orders for Palestinian houses. In this way, demolition of homes and property in the Occupied Territories represents continuity with policies central to Israel’s approach to Palestinian towns since 1948 (Halper 2006, 28–29).

If the Palestinian town suffers from

---

**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>4323</td>
<td>54100</td>
<td>90300</td>
<td>177411</td>
<td>268400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Jerusalem</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>33300</td>
<td>103900</td>
<td>137300</td>
<td>170123</td>
<td>186857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>6337</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>8400</td>
<td>38323</td>
<td>159900</td>
<td>231400</td>
<td>353871</td>
<td>455257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

similar land confiscations to the Arab town inside Israel, so too does the town in occupied Palestine suffer from the same attributes of isolation characteristic of Israeli Arab towns. What has emerged in occupied Palestine, as a result of the construction of settlements, checkpoints, and the barrier, is a geography of excommunicated urban enclaves: the areas in and around the cities of Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Tulkarem, Jericho, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, South Hebron, and the Jordan Valley (UNOCHA 2006). With vast expanses of the landscape closed, and with their connections to each other dramatically curtailed, these enclaves function much like the Palestinian urban “reserves” inside Israel. Ultimately, cities, and the activities they support, are not viable as isolated enclaves with no links to markets and other cities.

How this landscape of isolated enclaves compromises the networks of economic life between cities is visible in the situation at Al Haya Foods, a meat-processing firm located in the Palestinian town of El Eizariya, next to East Jerusalem. “Historically, much of our business was in East Jerusalem,” explains Banan Khatib, managing director of Al Haya. “Now, in order to sell to those shops, we have to travel almost to Jericho to bypass the Wall and checkpoints, so instead of a trip taking five minutes, the trip takes at least one hour, sometimes more.” He goes on to explain how the firm’s market in East Jerusalem has collapsed, while consumers in East Jerusalem do not have access to his products because of what he describes as the “new market geography throughout the West Bank” (Khatib 2004). As this market geography becomes more entrenched, and as cities become more isolated from the linkages that sustain them, they lose their vitality.

While the Wall plays a prominent role in undermining the town by reinforcing a geography of immobility upon the landscape, it plays a less well understood role in destroying the urban fabric by creating urban economic dead zones, spaces of commercial and industrial depression in cities. Proliferating throughout the West Bank, these dead zones emerge where the Wall and the 60- to 80-m “seam” around it come into proximity with commercial establishments. Where the Wall and its seam cast shadows upon nearby businesses in towns, the economic life of such establishments begins to deteriorate, while the space itself where these businesses are located assumes a depressed, abandoned character. One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon is on the Jerusalem–Hebron Road at the western entrance to the town of Bethlehem. Once a vibrant urban commercial strip, the area is now bounded by a large checkpoint terminal and surrounded by the Wall, many of its shops closed. Isam Albandek, owner of Albandek Marble and Stone, describes how the Wall 40 m from his facility is destroying his neighbourhood and, with it, his livelihood. “Because of the Wall, it is completely dead here,” he reveals. “There is no traffic, no people, no transport, no business.” In this dead area, the future for businesses is bleak. “If there is no change,” Albandek observes, “we will have to shut down one of the oldest manufacturing businesses in Palestine” (Albandek 2005).

While the Palestinian town has been compromised by land confiscations and territorial fragmentation associated with the matrix of control, the Palestinian farm has experienced a similar fate. Just as in Israel, most of the property confiscated for Jewish settlements is farmland. Typical is the experience of Mahmoud Sabatin of Husan. “In 1985, my family lost 40 dunums of land,” he explains. “Now houses from [the settlement of] Bettar Illit sit on land that was ours” (Sabatin 2006). Such reallocation of land, however, is not limited to the initial construction of settlements. The expansion of existing settlements—from large settlement blocs such as Modi’in Illit expanding onto land owned by farmers from Bil’in, Nal’in, and Deir Qaddis...
to smaller settlements such as Zufim expanding onto land owned by farmers from Jayyous—is also part of a process, in occupied Palestine, whereby land passes from one type of ownership into another.

Furthermore, in addition to settlements redeeming land from Palestinian farmers, other architectural elements on the landscape, notably the Wall, are promoting similar impacts, since most of this architectural infrastructure is being built on Palestinian farmland. In some instances, it is the direct impacts of construction that are destroying the Palestinian farm, as happened to Fayez and Mona Tanib of Irtah when occupation authorities constructed the Wall on their farm, destroying 60 of their 80 dunums of farmland (Tanib and Tanib 2008). In other instances the destructive impact of such infrastructure is more subtle—for example, when the Wall passes between the built-up area of a town and its adjoining farmland. This is the case in the Palestinian village of Jayyous, where the route of the Wall separates the village from its farms. In order to cross a gate in the barrier to get to their land, these farmers have to obtain a permit from Israeli authorities; but these authorities have denied permits to 80% of the farmers, and so their farmland is inaccessible to them. Either way—through direct confiscation or through the placement of infrastructure—is the result is the shrinkage of Palestinian cropland under cultivation and the continuing deterioration of the Palestinian farm.

What began as a process of re-imagining land in the late 19th century has assumed a social and material reality on the landscape. This landscape of farms erased and towns isolated is provoking demographic changes, transferring Palestinians into ever smaller and more restricted territorial spaces. This process has resulted in enormous demographic transformation inside Israel. It is being repeated, albeit more slowly and deliberately, in occupied Palestine, where Palestinians have been transferred to locations constituting less than 50% of Palestinian territory or roughly 10% of historic Palestine. Transferred to these new locations, many have assumed a new status as a landless, unemployed, and impoverished underclass. Land in Palestine has re-emerged with a new and far different character and identity.

**Concluding Remarks**

How does the remaking of landscape provide a common theme in an ongoing story about the exercise of modern power? This article addresses this question using the British enclosure movement to gain insight into the partitioned geography in Palestine today. These two cases reveal how English landowners and Jewish Zionists re-imagine territorial landscapes and exploit their power over groups anchored to the land in order to realize their imagined vision. In both cases, groups with power, by re-imagining landscape, redefine the meaning of belonging and entitlement to land. British landowners reshape territory by spreading the rent-maximizing farm across the landscape and making land private. Zionists reorder territory by spreading Jewish settlements across the landscape, making land Jewish. Both processes—one making the landscape private, the other making the landscape Jewish—involve the exercise of power by one group over another to reorder systems of land ownership and reconfigure lines of access and trespass on the land. In this way, making private property and making Jewish property are part of the same historical project of meaning making and boundary making. By putting these two cases of re-imagining and remaking land into a comparative framework, this argument seeks to give historical meaning to theoretical debates about the interplay of power and geographical space.

In re-imagining landscapes, groups with power use two instruments to realize their imagined vision: they use the law to impose a new structure of sovereignty on the
land, enlisting the state to help implement a new rule-making framework that redefines entitlement to, use of, and circulation across land; and they use the built environment to help reinforce legal changes in systems of sovereignty over the land. These instruments play a critical role in demographic transformations through which dominant groups succeed in coercing the transfer of populations as precondition and outcome of remaking the landscape, at the same time substituting themselves as the land’s legitimate cultivators and stewards. This process of re-imagining land, and of using systems of legality and architecture to remake it and transfer populations, is the basis of enclosures. What endures from enclosure when a different group takes control of land is a series of territorially inscribed outcomes, including changes in patterns of socio-economic activity, reconfigurations in systems of circulation and communication, redistributions of population groups on the land, and, finally, changes in the attributes and identity of the landscape itself.

In developing a line of continuity between the British enclosure movement and enclosure in Palestine today, this study reveals how the two basic routes to modernity embedded in these two cases—the development of capitalism and the development of nationalism—are comparable as projects of power and spatial reordering. At the same time, this conclusion about continuity and comparability in the two cases, while significant in a historical and theoretical sense, also has practical, present-day consequences. Although contending that their policies on the land in Palestine are uniquely related to circumstances and security concerns specific to the region, Israeli Zionists emerge, in this argument, as practitioners of power and reorganizers of space little different from the British landowners of an earlier age who remade land to generate more revenue. Both groups use power to transform land in accordance with an imagined vision, emphasizing how, even in very different contexts—one involving conflict between classes, the other involving identity conflict—power has a spatial dimension on the landscape.

If enclosure is a tendency of modern power, and if English landowners and Israeli Zionists share a certain likeness in improving and remaking land, then it would seem that, between these points in time, other historical environments might also be part of a similar logic. Re-imagining land as a precondition for enclosing and remaking it has been an ongoing territorial practice used by groups with power. Expanding the story of enclosure beyond the landscapes in this article is a promising agenda for future research on power and space.

Notes

1 Open fields and common fields were not always one and the same: common fields were largely open and unenclosed, but not all common fields were open, nor were all open fields common (Kerridge 1992, 5–16; Thirsk 1964).

2 “Cultivating the earth,” Locke argued, “introduces private possessions” (1690, ch. 5, s. 35).

3 Wage labour was actually of long standing in the English countryside, and most small peasant commoners were at least partially engaged in some wage work to supplement farm incomes. Consequently, rather than transforming propertied peasants into wage-dependent proletarians, parliamentary enclosure eroded their non-wage sources of subsistence, leaving them more completely dependent upon wage work (Humphries 1990, 18–19).

4 Nevertheless, as Oren Yiftachel shows, this process of land redemption is not driven exclusively by issues of ethno-religious identity. Redeeming Palestine is also a project of economic modernization consisting of a transformation in the agrarian, urban, and industrial structure on the land.

5 Ben-Gurion believed, however, that it would take an unprecedented historical upheaval for conditions to be right for transfer and that, in such circumstances, Zionists would have to
seize the opportunity.

6 I am indebted to Raja Shehadeh (2008) for enabling me to see the settlement project as an institution enclosing the landscape, and for suggesting key locations for viewing this phenomenon.

7 “Jewish leaders … strove to gain possession and ownership of as much of Israel’s sovereign space as possible by making use of the legal mechanisms of the state at their disposal” (Forman and Kedar 2004, 812).

8 In some cases, admittedly, Palestinians are allowed into settlements as manual labourers.

9 This insight on “camps” comes from the work of Adi Opher (2004).

References


Foundation for Middle East Peace. Settlement Information, Statistics and Tables http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/


Jabotinsky, V. [Z.] 1923. The iron wall (we and the Arabs).
http://www.marxists.de/middleast/iron-wall/ironwall.htm


Landscapes of Power: British Enclosure and the Palestinian Geography


